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The primary objective of this thesis is to propose a
template for a National Space Warfighting Architecture (NSWA).
The template is intended to fill the void that exists between
national security space policies and the services' space
warfighting plans. As such, it will provide a unifying
framework for follow-on discussions and debate about the
proper direction of space-based operational and tactical
combat support. In support of this objective, this thesis
aims to: provide the proper focus for the architecture;
identify the key conceptual ideas that should drive its
development; establish a common vocabulary among managers of
the Space-based Strategic Reconnaissance/Surveillance Program,
service space support officers, and terrestrial warfighters;
develop a logical and meaningful architectural organizational
approach; facilitate the comparison between space-based and
terrestrial-based combat support systems; and show how the
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. SPACE-BASED OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL COMBAT SUPPORT: A
NOVEL IDEA
The rapid and impressive growth of our (and others') civil
space programs makes it easy to forget that man's use of space
is a relatively new occurrence. Robotic surveys around and
beyond our solar system, manned trips to the moon, and myriad
activities in near-earth orbit belie the fact thdt the space
age is not quite 33 years old. If the history of mankind is
thought of as a single 24-hour day, all of men's space
ventures have taken place during the last 0.8 second [Ref.
l:p. 44].
Likewise, the explosive growth of military space programs
obscures the fact that the use of space to provide routine
combat support to operational and tactical forces is a new,
even novel, military development. To be sure, these forces
have relied on space systems to provide them with some
communications, weather, and navigational support almost from
the dawn of the space age. However, national security space
systems were conceived and evolved essentially to serve the
National Command Authorities (NCA), the National Intelligence
Community (NIC), and the strategic nuclear deterrent forces
[Ref. 2:p. 22]. It was not until 1988 that the national
security space sector was explicitly tasked to "meet the
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requirements of operational land, sea, and air forces through
all levels of conflict commensurate with their intended use"
[Ref. 3:p. 8].
As a result of this high level direction, space-based
support to terrestrial fighting forces is now a major mission
of the national security space program. In the words of Rear
Admiral David Frost, USN, former commander of the U.S. Naval
Space Command:
A lot of what's being discussed in space right now is
applying space assets more directly to the operational
problem of theater... and lower commanders... It really
represents a major shift in this country's approach
to the military space program... The whole Navy is in
favor of more movement in this direction.
[Ref. 2:p. 22]
With the recent changes in the international climate and
the relaxation of tensions with the Soviet Union, U.S. combat
forces should expect the momentum behind more responsive
space-based warfighting support to increase. Two primary
factors are iriving this growing momentum. First, U.S.
rilitary forces will be smaller, and a greater proportion of
these forces will be based within the continental United
States. And second, diverse and largely unpredictable
military threats from nations other than the Soviet Union will
preoccupy U.S. military leaders. Thus, the Department of
Defense (DoD) will become increasingly dependent on space
systems to provide timely crisis tip-offs and to support the
movement and control of U.S. combat forces around the globe.
And combat commanders will be able to increasingly rely on
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national space-based support to increase the effectiveness of
their smaller forces [Ref. 4:p. 10]. To quote General John
L. Piotrowski, USAF, former Commander-in-Chief (CINC) of the
U.S. Space Command:
Tomorrow's space operations will be pervasive in
combat. While today's operations provide our
commanders extensive support, tomorrow's will provide
even more. Commanders will depend on space as they
now depend on strategic and tactical airlift... field
artillery support and the like. They have every right
to expect this. Space operations tomorrow will be
characterized by... support to our tactical forces that
is more timely, more simple, more direct, and readily
available when they need it most. [Ref. 5:p. 65]
B. THE KEY PREREQUISITE: OVERCOMING THE "TENCAP ATTITUDE"
Before General Piotrowski's vision of routine, pervasive,
and responsive space-based wdrfighting support can be
realized, tht. information available from national security
space systems must be integrated within existing military
forces so as t: : ce .,n indispensable contributor to
terrestrial operations 'Ref. 6:p. 5]. This will be easier
said than done. There is a healthy amount of skepticism about
Lhe practicality of national space-baseO operational and
tactical support within the fighting forces. This deep-seated
skepticism is due largely to the military's experience with
exploitation of information derived from the U.S. Space-based
Strategic Reconnaissance/Surveillance Program (SSRSP).
As its name implies, the SSRSP was developed to provide
indications and warning of aerospace attack on the U.S.,
strategic intelliqence and warfighting support, and to prevent
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technological surprise. In fact, the SSRSP arguably provided
the primary motivation for the U.S. move into space, and its
£irst on-orbit components data back to 1960 [Ref. 7:pp. 66,
100, and 106]. Such was its success that its operations
became and remain one of the most closely held secrets of the
government. It was not until 1973, when the Army opened its
TENCAP (Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities)
Office, that the veil of secrecy surrounding the SSRSP was
lifted enough to explore the possibility of tasking the SSRSP
to support the needs of operational and tactical commanders
[Ref. 8:p. 1-3].
Despite this early Army initiative, the services clearly
were reluctant to count on, or plan for, routine space-based
reconnaissancc support during wartime. It literally took an
act of Congress -- buried in a 1977 Joint Appropriation Report
-- to spur the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps to establish
their own TENCAP offices [Ref. 8:p. 1-3]. One immediate
result of the proliferation of TENCAP programs was the Joint
Tactical Exploitation of National Systems (JTENS) manual --
a superb effort which outlines the steps necessary for
warfighters to task the SSRSP for reconnaissance support. But
images taken from space were so highly classified and subject
to so many handling and dissemination restrictions that the
integration of space-based reconnaissance information into
fast-moving combat operations was impossible. The long-time
strategic focus of the SSRSP and the strict secrecy
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surrounding its operations conspired against any real change
in the attitudes about space-based combat reconnaissance --
by either the SSRSP managers or the warfighters.
These deeply entrenched attitudes finally began to change
in the mid-1980's. The establishment of the U.S. Space
Command in 1985 provided a forum to forge a joint position on
space-based reconnaissance support. One of the first tasks
that the Command tackled was a revision of the Department of
Defense Space Policy. At the insistence of the Marine Corps
and the Army, the 1986 draft of the DoD Policy included a call
upon the national security space sector to provide
"operational" support for terrestrial forces [Ref. 9:p. 24].
This position found high-level support, and it was
subsequently incorporated into the next National Space Policy
(NSP), signed by President Reagan on 5 January 1988 [Ref. 3:p.
8].
This new policy notwithstanding, many warfighters continue
to doubt that the SSRSP and its managers have either the
capability or the inclination to meet their tactical
reconnaissance needs. The most telling evidence in support
of the former assertion is found in the U.S. Space Command's
intention to pursue a family of Tactical Satellites (TacSats),
expressly designed to provide direct support to military
commanders. While TacSats will also provide communications
and weather support, the comments of a former CINC of the
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Space Command make clear that reconnaissance is a key driver
in the program:
In my opinion, the combat commanders need assured
support from space systems to answers critical
battlefield questions like: "Has the enemy wing
dispersed? Is the bridge intact? Are there any naval
combatants in the operations area? Where is the
division command post?" The answer to these questions
are critical to the outcome of battlefield
engagements. They drive the targeting of long-range
weapons and influence the tactics a commander chooses.
[Ref. 10:p. 45]
By supporting TacSat development, it is clear from these
comments that the joint commander tasked with coordinating
space-b sed combat support does not believe that the SSRSP has
the capability to reliably answer these questions.
In defense of the second assertion, consider the following
passage. It is taken from a 1990 article by a Marine
Intelligence officer entitled "Our Continuing Self-Delusion
Regarding Tactical Intelligence Capabilities:"
Fallacy #1: National Systems Are There to Support the
Tactical Commander. The primary responsibility for
the national systems in operation today is to collect
indications and warnings and technical intelligence
at the strategic level.. .Keep in mind that if we do
get committed to a Third World conflict, the alerting
responsibility for which our national systems were
created will not go away (in fact, it would probably
increase if the Soviets are backing the other side).
Indications and warnings will still remain their
priority. The standard response to this argument is
"what about JTENS?" Isn't that set up to ensure that
the tactical user gets support? JTENS is an
afterthought. The system was developed to support
strategic goals. If critically short national assets
can also be used to support tactical ground operations
that's fine, but not at the expense of ignoring our
strategic requirements. [Ref. ll:p. 56]
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It would be easy to dismiss the foregoing doubts as
unjustified in light of the recent tasking of the national
security space program to provide "operational" support to
sea, air, and land forces. It would also be easy to believe
that these doubts are restricted to operations of the super-
secret SSRSP, an do ,,ot apply to the general concept of space-
based combat support. To do either, however, would be unwise.
The 1989 Naval Space Master Plan bluntly states that the Navy
and Marine Corps "will receive only limited tactical support
from the current inventory of overhead assets" [Ref. 12:p. ES-
2]. A recent article warns the Army that there is no
dedicated satellite support for tactical commanders within a
theater of operations, and that they will "have little or no
chance to use satellites already in orbit during times of war"
[Ref. l:p. 44].
With such widespread attitudes and doubts about the
availability of space-based combat support, it is perhaps
easier to understand why U.S. ground forces were not ready to
use the available services of the Global Positioning System
(GPS) in potential combat operations against Iraq in August
1990. The GPS system, in development since 1973, will
ultimately consist of a constellation of 21 transmitting
satellites that will provide highly accurate position,
velocity, and time measurements to any warfighter with the
proper receiver. Its tactical utility in a desert environment
that poses severe navigational challenges is easy to envision.
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Unlike the operations of the SSRSP, the GPS has been a "white"
program from its inception, designed specifically with the
warfighter in mind. GPS development satellites have been on-
orbit for over a decade, providing ample time for each of the
armed services to plan for the complete integration of the GPS
into their operations and tactics [Ref. 13:p. 1-7]. The Air
Force declared the system operational on 9 May 1990 (Ref.
14:p. 18], and as of 24 August, there were 14 on-orbit GPS
satellites capable of providing users with latitudes and
longitudes for up to 20 hours a day, and altitudes for up to
15 hours a day [Ref. 15:p. 2].
Given these seemingly perfect circumstances, it would be
logical to expect that the services would be well-equipped to
use GPS in their operations and tactics. But such is not the
case. Both the Army and the Marine Corps were forced to make
emergency purchases of commercial GPS receivers to equip units
deploying to the Gulf [Ref. 16:p. 3]. And in the words of
Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, the units given
receivers "are still learning how to use them" [Ref. 17:p.
74].
Why were our forces caught unprepared? The reason is
simple: warfighters doubted that the navigational service
would be available to them in time of war. According to the
commander of the Army Space Command, "(Army units) are no
longer asking 'Are those (GPS) satellites going to be there
during war? Can we really trust the Air Force to fly them?"'
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Instead, the commander reports, there is now "fierce"
competition among combat units for limited GPS receivers [Ref.
18:p. 2]. This graphic example of warfighters' "wait and see"
attitude about space-based combat support clearly demonstrates
that their skepticism goes far beyond misgivings about the
SSRSP.
The foregoing examples are by no means exhaustive. But
in the author's opinion, they reflect a widespread attitude
that must be changed before General Piotrowski's dream of
pervasive space-based combat support will become a reality.
The national security space sector must sweep away the very
real doubts created by an outdated, nearly two decade-old
approach toward space-based combat support -- the Tactical
Exploitation of National Capabilities.
The conceptual foundation for TENCAP is that national
space systems are first and foremost a strategic deterrent,
intelligence, and warfighting asset. As a result, operational
and tactical commanders have no guarantee that the systems
will support them in times of war, and little incentive to
integrate their capabilities into wartime plans. Moreover,
TENCAP information is often characterized by severe handling
and dissemination restrictions, limiting its use almost
exclusively to intelligence channels. These restrictions
hinder the development of other national system applications
with exciting tactical potential. Finally, TENCAP is a
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technologically driven approach to space-based combat support;
on-orbit capabilities drive tactics and not vice versa.
The symptoms of the associated TENCAP attitude are evident
in the examples outlined above. The first is widespread
skepticism within the warfightin forces about the
availability, usefulness, cost effectiveness, or combat
effectiveness of space-based combat support. The second ic
a widespread call for dedicated combat support satellites.
The third is the absence of new tactics based on unique space
capabilities. Indeed, there is a failure of combat forces
even to be prepared to exploit space capabilities in their
combat operations. The final symptom, alluded to but not
previously discussed, is an intensive education effort by the
space community to cure the TENCAP attitude. This effort is
made difficult by the very information restrictions that
characterize the TENCAP approach. Quoting Admiral Frost
again:
A lot of (space programs) tend to be classified, and
classified to the point where a lot of the average
fleet operators are not cleared to know some of the
things they would like to know about it.
[Ref. 2:p. 22]
How can the "TENCAP attitude" be overcome? One
alternative might be to embrace a new approach toward space-
based combat support: the Tactical Integration of National
Capabilities (TINCAP). The conceptual foundation for TINCAP
is that war -- any war -- is such a dangerous policy decision
that all available means and advantages must be fully
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exploited to achieve quick victory. The entire national
security space program is viewed in essence as a combat
support organization, ultimately designed to create
warfighting advantages across the spectrum of conflict. This
is not to imply that the national security space program will
not have a "main effort." But it does imply that the main
effort can be flexibly tailored to meet wartime contingencies.
This approach to space-based combat support is focused
squarely on the warfighter and not on technology. As a
result, it seeks to foster the development of new tactics and
techniques based around the unique advantages of space
systems, to truly integrate space-based combat support into
terrestrial operations.
C. A FRAMEWORK FOR DEBATE: A NATIONAL SPACE WARFIGHTING
ARCHITECTURE
Is the skepticism warfighters feel about receiving combat
reconnaissance support from the SSRSP justified? In an era
of declining defense budgets, is the decision to pursue
dedicated space-based combat support platforms a wise one?
Is there any real difference between TENCAP and TINCAP? These
are questions that go to the heart of the debate about space-
based combat support. Their answers will in large part
determine if warfighters will ever come to depend on "space
as they now depend on strategic and tactical airlift,... field
artillery support and the like."
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Unfortunately, when debate and argument take place outside
a mutually accepted framework for discussion, the result often
resembles two simultaneous monologues, with no real attempt
by the disagreeing parties to reach an amicable solution. But
when debate and argument take place within a mutually accepted
framework, the result is often meaningful dialogue -- an open
and frank exchange of ideas that leads to common understanding
and harmony [Ref. 19:p. 503].
One way to establish such a framework is to develop simple
questions that guide and shape the debate. For example, the
Navy has three prioritized questions that must all be answered
before developing a space system:
- Is the requirement critical enough to justify the
investment?
- Is a space system or program the only reasonable way
to achieve the required capability?
- Is the capability achievable/affordable?
[Ref. 12:p. 5-1]
However, such questions still do noc provide any common ground
between space support officers and warfighters. For example,
the requirement for accurate and timely tactical
reconnaissance for military operations is considered self-
evident. So the next key test is whether or not a separate
space-based reconnaissance system is the only reasonable way
to achieve the support not already provided by, or what can
be reasonably expected from, the SSRSP and terrestrial
reconnaissance systems. The only way to effectively debate
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this question is to have framework -- an architecture -- that
establishes a common conceptualization of space-based combat
support among the managers of the SSRSP, service space support
officers, and the warfighters.
Therein lies the rub. While each service is busily
pursuing its own version of a space warfighting architecture,
the guide for their development and the glue to integrate them
within the entire national security space program -- a
National Space Warfighting Architecture (NSWA) -- is absent.
Moreover, the evolving service architectures seem to focus
more on space systems and space decision makers ana less on
the warfighter and how space can help him win a fight. For
example, consider Figure 1, an early version of a "generic"
Naval Space Warfighting Architecture (Ref. 20:p. 1-3]. Notice
its emphasis is on on-orbit satellites and satellite control
networks. It is hard for the author to conceive how this
emphasis would help a warfighter to understand the conceptual
underpinning of space-based combat support; or to understand
how he might best integrate space-based support into his
combat plans and operations. The focus on technology and
physical and informational structures is arguably of great
assistance to space support officers. The problem is that
this is the wrong focus and wrong audience for a warfighting
architecture. The only proper focus and audience for a
warfighting architecture is war and the commanders and -cs
tasked to win it.
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A central premise of this thesis is that until a true
National Space Warfighting Architecture is developed, there
will be neither meaningful integration of national space
capabilities into our operating forces, nor meaningful debate
about which operational and tactical combat support roles are
best conducted from space.
D. OBJECTIVE
The primary objective of this thesis is to propose a
template for the development of a National Space Warfighting
Architecture. The template is intended to fill the void that
exists between national security space policies and the
services' space warfighting plans. In support of this
objective, this thesis aims to: provide the proper focus for
the architecture; identify the key conceptual ideas that
should drive its development; establish a commn vocabulary
among managers of the SSRSP, service space support officers,
and the warfighters; develop a logical and meaningful
architectural organizational approach; facilitate the
comparison between spacs-based and terrestrial-based combat
support systems; and show how the NSWA fits within the larger
framework of the National Space Program. The ultimate goal
of the NSWA is to provide a starting point for follow-on
discussions and debate about the proper direction of space-
based operational and tactical combat support. As such, the
author hopes to highlight a new way of looking at how space-
15
based combat support can aid in the preparation and execution
of battle.
E. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
The template for the National Space Warfighting
Architecture is not intended to be complete; it is a top-level
architecture only. As such, the scope of this thesis covers
the broader conceptual and organizational aspects of space-
based operational/tactical combat support. Technological
concepts will be discussed only as they relate to this top-
level architecture.
In the author's opinion, one of the primary reasons why
the idea of space-based combat support has yet to be fully
embraced by warfighters is because of the secrecy surrounding
many of the operations of the national security space sector.
Until the veil which covers national space systems is at least
partially lifted, education efforts aimed at increasing the
awareness and appreciation of national capabilities will be
severely hindered. The author therefore felt compelled to
write this thesis at the unclassified level. While this
decision will ensure the widest possible forum for any follow-
on discussion or debate, it also ensures that many fundamental
issues concerning space-based combat support cannot be covered
due to security reasons. This is the key limitation of this
thesis. An important theme that runs throughout this work is
that it is time to reevaluate the impact that classification
16
policies have on attempts to integrate space information into
combat operations and tactics.
This thesis is written by a Marine (primarily) for other
Marines. The author hopes that it will stir interest about
space-based support to Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF)
operations and to spur the Marine Corps leadership to lead the
way in driving the integration of national systems into combat
training and operations. However, another of its aims is to
introduce the managers of national security space programs to
important warfighting concepts. Therefore, the author's only
assumption is that most of the national security space
managers do not understand war, and most Marines do not
understand space-based combat support. Hopefully, this thesis
will help to establish a common dialogue between the
warfighters and the managers tasked to support them.
17
II. TOWARD A NATIONAL SPACE WARFIGHTING ARCHITECTURE
A. INTRODUCTION
A very real problem facing space support officers is the
difficulty in measuring or demonstrating the operational and
tactical utility of space-based combat support. For example:
The challenge of a strong naval role in space
continues to be the quantification of the value added
to naval warfare in...operating relatively high cost
space systems. This can be overcome by (providing)
a greater realization of the potential support
(offered) by space-based assets. [Ref. 12:p. ES-8]
One way around this problem is to create a conceptual
framework that demonstrates how to view space-based combat
support within the overall context of war and warfighting.
This framework would purposely reverse the normal thrust of
articles on military space operations. Instead of trying to
turn warfighters into space warfare experts, it would attempt
to make space support officers more aware of the nature of
war. In place of orbitology primers and listings of on-orbit
satellites and their capabilities, this framework would
present, from the point of view of a varfighter, how national
space capabilities can best be used to influence the outcome
of war on earth. Such a framework would take the form of a
National Space Warfighting Architecture.
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B. JUST WHAT IS A (WARFIGHTING) ARCHITECTURE?
In its broadest sense, architectural design involves the
engineering of systems of systems [Ref. 21:p. 1]. A system
is a set of interacting people, resources, and procedures that
receives input from its operating environment, transforms
these inputs in some way, and then transmits outputs back into
the environment. This definition implies that the system is
an "open" one. That is, the system adapts to the environment
as well as adapts the environment to itself [Ref. 22:p. 4].
The hierarchy of architectural design is composed of three
critical, interdependent tiers [Ref. 21:p. 1]. The top level
of the hierarchy is the architecture itself -- a set of
purposive, organized, and interrelated decision makers (some
human, others automated), with an associated information flow,
performing assigned missions within a common environment [Ref.
22:p. 3]. Its ultimate goal is to create unity of effort and
cohesiveness among decision makers in the accomplishment of
their missions [Ref. 23:p. 1]. A critical point that bears
reemphasis is that an architecture springs from and is guided
by its explicit design missions. If the architecture is to
support more than one mission simultaneously, unity of effort
demands that these missions be prioritized in an unambiguous
way. This prioritization need not be static; more often than
not the priority of the architecture's design missions change
dynamically with changes to the architecture's environment
[Ref. 24].
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When a top level architecture is decomposed into is
component physical human systems, the result is called system
engineering. System engineering transforms an operational
need identified by the top level architecture into specific
measures of component system performance. It also develops
component system configurations designed to integrate chosen
technologies into the top level architecture and ensure the
compatibility of all systems' physical, mechanical, and
functional interfaces. The goal of system engineering is to
clarify and optimize each component system's definition and
design within the overarching framework of the top level
architecture [Ref. 22:p. 2].
The lowest, most detailed rung on the architectural design
ladder is design engineering of each component system's
subsystems [Ref. 21:p. 1]. Both system and design engineering
are useful, even vital, when attempting to explain how
specific te( Dlogies are to be used to support the top level
architecture s decision-making structure. But if it is
accepted that the architecture's design missions ultimately
drive the selected technologies and not vice versa, then it
is neither necessary nor prudent to include this level of
detail in the "top level" architecture.
Remember that an architecture's main goal is to foster
unity of effort and cohesiveness among decision makers in the
accomplishment of assigned mission(s). Once its design
missions are selected, the role of the top level architecture
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is to provide a common understanding or conceptualization of:
the environment in which the decision makers operate;
individual and organizational decision making concepts, and
architectural organizing approaches [Ref. 23:p. 1). On the
other hand, the system engineering level aims to describe how
a selected group of technologies can be forged together to
facilitate some specific aspect of the top level
architecture's decision-making process. Since these
descriptions exhibit many architectural characteristics,
including decomposition to a lower, more detailed level
(design engineering), system engineering will hereafter be
referred to as the subarchitecture tier of the architectural
hierarchy.
The transition between a top level architecture and its
associated subarchitectures is marked by a sublevel that lists
all decision-making tasks that may be accomplished or aided
through the intervention of technology. This transition
sublevel works in two ways: it identifies to the
architecture's decision makers all those tasks that are
technologically feasible; and the presence of a
subarchitecture indicates that a specific technology to
accomplish a task has been pursued and integrated within the
architecture's decision-making structure. In this way, the
top level architecture is able to spell out how srlected,
available technologies can be used to assist its decision
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makers without resorting to the level of technical detail
found in its component subarchitectures [Ref. 23:p. 1].
With the foregoing architectural concepts as a guide, it
is time to return to the question posed in the title of this
section: Just what is a warfighting architecture? A
warfighting architecture is a top level view of the
information processing, decision making, an action processes
of combat organizations [Ref. 23:p. 1]. This definition is
important in that it equates designing architectures to
designing an organization with a common mission.
Organizations are composed of (groups of) people as well as
machines. But the organization's basic building blocks are
people and their roles in the organization. Therefore, a top
level warfighting architecture properly focuses on warfighting
commanders and their forces and not on the technology that
serves them [Ref. 22:p. 3].
Organizations exist to accomplish some mission. A
warfighting architecture's combat missions convey how it is
expected to alter the wartime environment in such a way as to
influence the opponent, or perhaps more correctly, the
opponent's behavior. In turn, the architecture identifies,
either explicitly or implicitly, its overall "environmental
influencing strategy." Combat organizations operate in a
hostile, ever-changing environment where adherence to preset
plans is tantamount to disaster. If a combat architecture
hopes to accomplish its assigned missions, it must be capable
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of real time adaptation to the wartime environment. One of
the most important requirements of any architecture's design
is that it must match its operating environment. Only in this
way will the architecture's environmental influencing strategy
be effective and its missions be accomplished [Ref. 23:pp. I-
2]. This is especially true of a warfighting architecture.
In addition to highlighting its influencing strategy, a
warfighting architecture is deliberately structured to
identify all relevant combat decision-making processes and
functions. However, since the architecture seeks to foster
unity of effort among many divergent combat units working
toward a common mission, its processes and functions must have
a conceptual rather than a specific flavor. Although they
must be specific enough to provide common understanding and
cohesiveness among the architecture's decision makers, they
must also be broad and flexible enough to apply to all combat
roles performed by different types of decision makers. [Ref.
24]
Boundaries explain what is part of an organization and
what is not. A warfighting architecture's boundary surrounds
only those forces involved in combat. In this way, the
fighting forces' unique operating environment, missions,
influencing strategies, functions, and technologies are
brought sharply into focus [Ref. 22:p. 4]. To be sure, the
warfighting architecture may be supported by different sets
of decision makers, operating in different environments.
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However, these supporting architectures and subarchitectures
have a common characteristic: their decision makers never face
the same moral or physical demands of combat. A warfighting
architecture deals with war and those who fight it; those not
buffeted by war's hostile environment are excluded from its
boundary.
One final point. A warfighting architecture deals with
technology only insofar as it identifies those technological
concepts that can be used or pursued to assist warfighting
forces to accomplish their combat missions. Specific
technologies, system components, or physical structures have
no place within a top level view of combat decision and
action. These technical details are properly reserved for the
warfighting architecture's supporting subarchitectures.
C. WHY A NATIONAL SPACE WARFIGHTING ARCHITECTURE?
Having discussed the characteristics of architectures in
general and warfighting architectures in particular, it is now
time to focus in on the main subject of this thesis: a
National Space Warfighting Architecture. A NSWA will fill the
void that presently exists between national and DoD military
space policies, and the services' efforts to define their own
roles in space. As a top level architecture, its primary
intent is to foster unity of effort and cohesiveness among the
services and the entire national security space sector with
regards to space-based combat support. And as a warfighting
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architecture, it focuses more on how commanders and their
forces can best use space-based support to gain an advantage
in earthly combat, and less on the capabilities or combat
utility of specific space assets.
The conceptual intent of the NSWA is akin to that of an
"operational" space doctrine. An operational doctrine is:
derived from "basic" doctrine, and in turn, should
apply (its) basic principles within "the context of
distinct objectives, force capabilities, broad mission
areas, and operational environments." [Ref. 25:p. 59]
Some might therefore argue that the development of the NSWA
should be delayed in favor of forging a joint service
operational space doctrine. The author rejects this argument
for three reasons.
First, there is no basic military space doctrine to guide
or shape the development of an operational space doctrine.
Basic doctrine "includes the most fundamental and enduring
beliefs that guide the proper use of (fighting) forces in
military action" [Ref. 25:p. 59]. There is a document
entitled AFM 1-6. Military Space Doctrine [Ref. 6], but it
neither applies to the military as a whole nor is it doctrine
in the truest sense of the word. It is an Air Force document,
not even cited by the Navy in the development of their Space
Master Plan [Ref. 12:p. 10]. And in the words of one Air
Force officer, "instead of explaining how US space forces will
be employed in future conflicts, it simply restates current
public policy (about space)" [Ref. 25:p. 57]. On the other
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hand, the only requirement to start development of a space
warfighting architecture is a clear statement of the missions
it is designed to support. As will be seen, these missions
are evident at both the national and DoD level.
Second, because each of the services are pursuing their
own vision of space warfare, it will be difficult in the near
term to force a universally accepted or applicable space
warfighting doctrine. For example, the Navy envisions space
as "a place that offers the Navy certain advantages in
executing already existing roles and missions [Ref. 26:p. 39].
Not surprisingly, the official Navy position on space is that
"space systems acquisition, development, and operation must
be for a single purpose -- to support the warfighter" [Ref.
12:p. ES-3]. Meanwhile, the Air Force emphasizes the
development of a space warfighting capability. According to
AFM 1-6:
The nation's highest defense priority -- deterrence
-- requires a warfighting capability across the
spectrum of conflict. From the battlefield to the
highest orbit, airpower will provide that capability.
[Ref. 6:foreword]
This emphasis is especially evident in recent calls within
the Air Force for a national military space doctrine of space
superiority. The logic behind this argument is that the
principal mission of the army is the destruction of the
hostile army, and the principal missions of the navy and air
force are the destruction of the hostile navy and air forces,
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respectively. Ergo, "it would seem to follow that the
principal missions of US military space forces should be the
destruction of hostile space forces" [Ref. 25:p. 58]. With
such divergent service views about the primary mission of
space forces, it is hard for the author to imagine that a
consensus on military space doctrine will emerge without a
better conceptual framework for discussion and debate about
the role of space in war. A NSWA is ideally suited to provide
such a framework.
Third, in the author's opinion, a "military" space
doctrine is simply not enough if the services ever hope to
move beyond the hobbling view of TENCAP and to fully integrate
all available space capabilities into their plans and
operations. While exploitation is the act of turning to one's
own use [Ref. 19:p. 646], integration is the act of putting
or bringing (parts) together into a whole; a unification [Ref.
19:p. 953]. As long as the SSRSP operations are treated
scparately from other military space operations, the
conceptual foundation of military space support will remain
squarely on the former at the expense of the latter. Only a
truly national conceptualization of space-based combat support
can hope to unify all elements of the national security space
program into a cohesive whole. The best means toward this end
would seem to be National Space Warfighting Architecture.
Paraphrasing the reasoning behind the Navy's decision to
develop a Naval Space Warfighting Architecture, a NSWA
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provides a structure that will enable all components of the
national security space sector to address space-based combat
support issues from a common point of departure through the
employment of a standard set of terminology [Ref. l:p. E-l].
D. THE NATIONAL SPACE WARFIGHTING ARCHITECTURE'S NINE
BUILDING BLOCKS
Given that a National Space Warfighting Architecture is
the best means to unify the services' emerging warfighting
plans and architectures, the next step is to develop the
building blocks necessary for its construction. The first
such building block is a common vocabulary. As a framework
for dialogue about space-based combat support among all
members of the national security space sector, the NSWA's
vocabulary must necessarily include important warfighting
concepts and terms.
The second building block consists of the NSWA's design
missions. As has been said, an architecture's development
springs from and is guided by a set of explicit design
missions. Without a consensus about these missions, the NSWA
will be dead in its tracks.
By its very nature, a NSWA excludes from its boundaries
many important space support decision makers. Therefore, the
third building block is the NSWA's relationship to all other
national security space architectures.
The next building block is a thorough understanding of the
architecture's operating environment -- war and combat. Along
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with a supporting vocabulary, a common conceptualization of
the warfighting environment will be critical to establishing
unity of effort in space-based combat support among the
diverse members of the national security space sector.
The fifth building block consists of individual decision
making concepts. These concepts are especially critical for
an architecture that hopes to be equally relevant to all
warfighters, and universally applicable to all combat
situations. The heart of the NSWA must be a generic model
that effectively explains the combat decision action cycle
[Ref. 23:p. 1].
The sixth building block expands the individual decision
making concepts to include organizational decision making
concepts. A common understanding of individual decision
making is clearly not enough in a warfighting architecture.
The NSWA must also successfully portray the relationships
between and among the architecture's interrelated decision
makers, at all echelons of command [Ref. 23:p. 1].
The seventh building block, the architecture's organizing
strategy, is inextricably linked to both individual and
organizational decision making. The organizing strategy
determines the physical framework of the architecture in that
it forces choices about how to structure the architecture's
decision makers and how to describe their decision making
processes [Ref. 23:p. 3]. In other words, this building block
represents the NSWA's decomposition strategy.
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The next building block consists of technological
concepts. Technological concepts will mark the lower-most
stage of the NSWA's decomposition strategy. They define the
interrelationship between space technologies and the NSWA's
decision makers by matching tasks associated with the
architecture combat decision action process to feasible space
support capabilities [Ref. 23:p. 1].
The NSWA's final building block is its environmental
adaptation strategy. Recall that architectures constrain the
range of strategies that can be used by decision makers to
influence their environment or enemy. As will be seen,
however, the Air Force and the Navy differ significantly from
the Army and the Marine Corps in how they attempt to influence
their enemies. A key to forging a consensus about space-based
combat support will hinge on the NSWA's ability to accommodate
and facilitate the very different combat adaptation strategies
of each of the services.
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
The remainder of this thesis will by and large be
concerned with developing the NSWA's nine architecture
building blocks, and constructing these blocks in such a way
as to present a new conceptualization of space-based combat
support. The next chapter, National Space Policy:
Establishing the Basis for a NSWA, identifies the NSWA's
baseline combat missions and identifies the relationship
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between the NSWA and supporting national security space
architectures. Chapter IV, War: the Desperate Gamble, will
define the NSWA's operating environment. It introduces the
unique elements that shape the atmosphere of war and the
climate of combat. The next chapter, entitled "Warfighting
Concepts, serves two purposes. It expands the vocabulary of
war started in Chapter IV, and introduces several concepts
important to the NSWA. Chief among these concepts are the
different levels of command in war, key to the NSWA's "how-
to-organize" approach; and the two different combat adaptation
strategies: attrition and maneuver. The Combat Action
Process: A Model, presents a conceptual model of both
individual and organizational decision/action cycles in
combat. The model will be universally relevant: it applies
equally to all services, at all levels of command, and in all
tactical situations. This model will be the central building
block of the NSWA. Chapter Vii, Tiw ,aa Space
Warfighting Architecture, takes the building blocks developed
in the previous four chapters, and constructs the NSWA. The
Conclusions and Recommendations chapter will highlight the key
points presented throughout the thesis, and offer some
recommendations to the National Security Space Sector, the US
Naval Space Command, and the US Marine Corps.
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III. NATIONAL SPACE POLICY: ESTABLISHING THE BASIS FOR A NSWA
A. INTRODUCTION
The decision to develop a National Space Warfighting
Architecture triggers two immediate requirements. The first
is to identify the architecture's appropriate combat missions.
These combat missions, when viewed within the context of the
architecture's special operating environment, help to
precisely define the limit an shape of the NSWA's boundary.
As has been stated, this boundary excludes from its
confines some important space support decision makers who
operate in different environments. In other words, the NSWA
is only one of several interrelated, yet distinct, national
security space architectures. How many others are there?
What are the relationships among them? The second requirement
is to fashion the answers to these questions.
Since the use of space to support national security
objectives in general, and warfighting forces in particular,
is a policy decision of the highest order, it is perhaps
unsurprising that the basic answers to these two questions are
found within the National Space Policy (NSP). Accordingly,
the first order of business is to determine how the National
Space Warfighting Architecture is related to, and shaped by,
the NSP.
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B. NATIONAL SPACE POLICY: AN OVERVIEW
1. General
The current version of the National Space Policy dates
back to 5 January 1988. The result of a five-month long
interagency government review, it reflects all prior
Presidential decisions concerning space, the recommendations
of a National Commission on Space, and an analysis of the
implications of the 1986 Space Shuttle disaster [Ref. 3:p. 1].
In its eleven short pages, the NSP spells out the government's
strong commitment to a robust national space program, and
leaves little doubt that national security considerations are
a key driver behind this commitment. For example, the first
goal of US space activities is "to strengthen the security of
the United States." Moreover, of the policy's seven guiding
principles, the first two read:
-- The U.S. is committed to the exploration and
use of outer space by all national for
peaceful purposes. "Peaceful purposes" allow
for activities in pursuit of national security
goals.
-- The U.S. will pursue activities in space in
support of its inherent right of self-defense
and its defense commitments to its allies.
[Ref. 3:pp. 1-2]
After outlining its overall goals and principles, the
NSP then presents its four key components: the Civil,
Commercial, National Security, and Inter-Sector Space
Policies, and their associated sector guidelines. Each will
be discussed in turn.
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2. The Component Policies
a. The Civil Space Policy
The Civil Space Policy is geared toward those
space activities which enhance the Nation's "science,
technology, economy, pride, sense of well being,
direction,...world prestige and leadership." Centered around
the efforts of the National Aerospace and Space Administration
(NAbA), the civil space program's primary objective is to
expand knowledge of the Earth, its environment, the solar
system, and the universe [Ref. 3:p. 2].
b. The Commercial Space Policy
The Commercial Space Policy encourages the
development of a national commercial space sector, one that
relies on market forces to create programs that hold potential
economic benefit to the US. However, commercial sector
programs are regulated, in part, by "national security space
considerations" [Ref. 3:pp. 2-3]. This is in apparent
reference to the commercial space sector guidelines, which
direct the Department of Commerce to recommend options for
future "advanced earth remote sensing systems for commercial
use" [Ref. 3:p. 7]. Clearly, such systems have potential
military applications.
c. The )Iational Security Space Policy
The National Security Space Policy states that
space activities will help the US achieve its overall security
objectives by: deterring, or defense against an enemy attack;
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assuri-g continued access to space; negating enemy access to
or use of space; and enhancing the operations of US forces and
her allies [Ref. 3:p. 3]. To accomplish these objectives, the
NSSP goes on to codify the four broad space mission areas
designated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). These areas
are: force enhancement, space control, force application, and
space support.
Under force enhancement, the NSSP directs the national
security space sector to:
... develop, operate, and maintain space systems and
develop plans and architectures to meet the
requirements of operational land, sea, and air forces
through all levels of conflict commensurate with their
intended use. [Ref. 3:p. 8]
In other words, the objective of force enhancement is to
improve the warfighting capabilities of terrestrial fighting
forces through space-based combat support [Ref. 12:p. 1-12].
Note that this mission area's explicit call for "plans and
architectures" provides a clear motivation for the development
of a NSWA.
Space control requires DoD to "develop, operate, and
maintain enduring space systems to ensure its freedom of
action in space." Specifically, this involves a combination
of space surveillance, satellite survivability, and an
antisatellite capability [Ref. 3:p. 8]. This mission area
seeks to ensure friendly freedom of action throughout the
space medium, and to simultaneously deny any enemy the same
freedom of action [Ref. 12:p. 1-13].
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Force application requires DoD, consistent with treaty
obligations, to pursue research, development, and planning for
strategic defenses. Such defenses will be acquired and
deployed "should national security conditions dictate" [Ref.
3:p. 8]. This tasking fails to address the power projection
aspect of force application . Power projection is defined by
JCS as attacking terrestrial targets from space. The reason
for this omission appears to be that there are no capabilities
nor scheduled programs in this mission area [Ref. 12:p. 1-21].
Space (mission) support obligates the national
security space sector to use manned and unmanned launch
vehicles, from both East and West coasts, to ensure continued
access into space for US national security satellites.
Furthermore, it tasks DoD to develop survivable and robust
satellite command and control, processing, and data
dissemination networks [Ref. 3:p. 8]. In other words, space
support consists of all those activities necessary to deploy,
maintain, and sustain spacecraft on orbit [Ref. 12:p. 1-12].
d. Inter-sector Space Policies
Inter-sector policies cover those policies that
apply to, and are binding on, both the "national security and
civil space sectors" [Ref. 3:p. 3]. the omission of the
commercial space sector seems clearly a mistake, as the
policy's accompanying guidelines include many references to
inter-sector commercialization requirements [Ref. 3:pp. 9-10].
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In any event, these policies cover such diverse subjects as
space technology transfer, space debris, and space arms
control policies -- all of which have potential impact on
military operations in space.
3. Analysis, Issues, and Problems
The NSP outlines the nation's civil, commercial, and
national security space goals in a logical and convincing way.
More to the point, it makes clear that a major part of the
national space effort is dedicated to national security
activities, and provides the motivation for a NSWA through its
component National Security Space Policy. However, there are
several omissions from the National Space Policy and the NSSP
that have a direct impact on the development of a NSWA.
First, there are no explicit inter-sector guidelines
that cover the transfer of control of appropriate civil and
commercial space activities to DoD during times of war. For
example, what is the minimum acceptable level of civil space
communications during war? Under what circumstances might
control of US commercial communications satellites or
satellite receiving antennas be transferred to DoD? What are
the mechanisms for such a transfer? Perhaps a Civil Reserve
Satellite Fleet, analogous to the airlines' CRAF (Civil
Reserve Aircraft Fleet), could be implemented to cover these
problems. In any event, the NSP seems the proper forum for
these types of guidelines. At the very least, its inter-
sector policies should identify the government agency
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responsible for such planning, and then task that agency to
carry it out.
Similarly, there are no clear-cut guidelines
explaining the circumstances under which DoD might deny
otherwise available commercial services during times of
conflict. Two examples come to mind: the Global Positioning
System and the LandSat Program.
The GPS, discussed in the first chapter, transmits in
two different modes. The encrypted mode, intended for use by
US and allied military forces, will offer (among other things)
location accuracies no worse than 16 meters spherical error
probability (sep). The unencrypted mode, available to anyone
with E commercial receiver, will normally provide user
locations with accuracies within 70 meters sep [Ref. 27:p.
23]. The usefulness of even the 70 meter service is such that
there is now a trade magazine dedicated solely to GPS
technology spin-offs and commercial applications [Ref. 28].
The problem is, there are also many military uses for the
unencrypted GPS signal, perhaps chief among them land
navigation in close or desolate terrain. To prevent an
adversary from gaining any benefit from the GPS, DoD may
tamper with the unencrypted GPS signal to further degrade its
accuracy [Ref. 13:p. 2-1]. But under what circumstances will
this occur? Will DoD have the freedom to tamper with the GPS
signal on its own authority? Would a counterinsurgency
operation prompt the denial of 70 meter service? How much
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notice could commercial users expect to receive before service
is denied?
Similar questions arise when considering LandSat.
LandSat spacecraft are owned by the US government but are
managed by the Earth Observation Satellite Company in Lanham,
Maryland. The spacecraft collect digital imagery in seven
different spectral bands, providing any paying customer with
customized views of the earth. Depending on the bands used,
the images can highlight important features of a region and
provide a variety of information with commercial applications:
soil water content, crop production, drought effects, etc.
[Ref. 29:pp. 55-56]. However, the images also have widespread
military applications. According to one Deputy CINC of the
US Space Command, LandSat has:
... paved the way for a revolution in amphibious and
strike warfare. By identifying terrain character-
istics... and camouflage techniques, the probability
of success of special force and amphibious assault
force missions or land warfare can be greatly
increased. [Ref. 30:p. 14]
Given its military usefulness, would LandSat images be
available to commercial users during times of conflict? Or
would its operation be dedicated solely to US military
support? The NSP's inter-sector policies need not attempt to
list every possible scenario that might lead to the denial of
government space services that might otherwise be commercially
available. However, it should at least address all services
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that could potentially be affected, as well as the general
policy guidelines for such moves.
,An-th r ori!sion in the National Security Space Policy
has a more direct impact on the development of a NSWA, as well
as other supporting security space architectures. Although
the NSSP explicitly calls for the development of "plans and
architectures" to meet the requirements of "operational"
warfighting forces, it fails to answer the following obvious
question: how many and what types of architectures will
fulfill this tasking?
One answer to this question evolves by taking a new
look at the mission areas in the NSSP from the perspective of
the architectural concepts developed in the previous chapter.
Recall that an architecture is a set of interrelated decision
makers, with an associated information flow, performing
assigned missions within a common environment. By identifying
different sets of decision makers, operating environments, or
design missions, the general outlines of separate national
security space architectures should be revealed.
As its name states, the NSWA is a warfighting
architecture; its design environment is war. As such, its
missions should be ruthlessly focused on one thing: how to
shape the climate of combat in such a way as to create a
relative advantage in battle. The NSWA itself is not
concerned with how space support satellites are lofted into
orbit, even though its effectiveness is directly affected by
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the ability to accomplish this task. Nor is it concerned with
research and development or design activities, even though
beth activit!4c v.ill ev~rtually impart on the sp~cc. suiport
abilities at hand. The NSWA is fccused on the combat
commander and his forces, and how they expect or intend to
use space to prevail in terrestrial combat. Accordingly, the
NSWA's baseline combat missions include force enhancement,
space control, and the operational (as opposed to the research
and development) aspects of force enhancement.
As was alluded to in the previous paragraph, the space
support mission is excluded from the NSWA. There are two
reasons for this. First, space support is what a warfighter
would regard as an "implied mission." If the NSSP calls for
space-based support for terrestrial operations, then
warfighting commanders will naturally expect that the
capability to launch, operate, and maintain the appropriate
space systems will follow. More importantly, both the
decision makers and the environment for the space support
mission are different enough from those found in the NSWA to
warrant a related, but separate Space Mission Support
Architecture (SMSA). The design missions for the SMSA would
mirror the space support missions outlined in the NSSP.
Similarly, the research and development activities
referred to as in the NSSP's force application mission clearly
call for a separate Space Research, Development, and
Acquisition Architecture (SRDAA). The engineering,
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purchasing, and contracting environment is distinct from both
the combat environment of the NSWA and the space mission
r,"pport cnvirrnnt of the Z1SA. The SRDAA hac twc dcsign
missions: to "preserve and enhance...technology areas having
the greatest potential to advance military space capabilities
beneficial to national security" [Ref. 31:p. 2]; and the
development, design, and acquisition of national security
space systems.
There is one final national security space
architecture that is less apparent than the previous three,
but just as important to gaining a full picture of the
national security space effort. Note that the NSSP assigns
responsibility for the space control and force application
missions to DoD, while it tasks the "national security space
sector" with the responsibility for force enhancement and
space support. Since DoD is obviously a component part of the
national security space sector, this wording implies that
another agency or program is involved in providing space
support to warfighting forces. That other program is the
SSRSP. The final national security space architecture is the
Space-based Strategic Reconnaissance/Surveillance Architecture
(SSRSA).
Just like any other architecture, the SSRSA should be
built around clearly stated missions. For example, peacetime
SSRSP security missions could include warning of aerospace
attack upon the US; arms control and treaty verification;
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crisis monitoring; technical intelligence; and support of drug
interdiction operations. In the author's opinion, the
T4tion1 Rnar Policy- in the form nf its NSSP, seems the
proper forum to list these missions, especially in light of
their vital contrib-tion to the nation's well being and
overall security. The advocacy of the use of US space
capabilities to advance the cause of peace on earth is long
overdue. In support of this contention, one has only to
review the original motivation behind classifying the
existence of the SSRSP, and consider the changes that have
since occurred.
In 1954, the United States was losing the strategic
information war. The Eisenhower Administration, faced with
an increasingly belligerent, nuclear-armed Soviet Union, had
no reliable way to penetrate the "Iron Curtain" and develop
useful strategic intelligence. The National Intelligence
Community was reduced to sending high altitude, camera-
equipped balloons across the eastern Soviet border, with the
hope of recovering them eight to ten days later in Alaska,
Japan, or the Bering Sea. Code named "Moby Dick," the balloon
program was wholly unreliable. Of the 516 balloons launched,
only 40 returned photos, covering only eight per cent of the
Sino-Soviet landmass [Ref. 32:p. 13]. Clearly, the amount
and reliability of information concerning the only enemy
thought capable of destroying the US would have to be
increased.
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To help him solve this problem, President Eisenhower
established a Technological Capabilities Panel (TCP), headed
bv James R. Killian, Jr., then piesident of MIT. The TCP's
final report, "Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack," was
published in 1955. It included one whole section on the
development of highly advanced intelligence collection
systems, among them earth circling satellites [Ref. 7:pp. 66-
67].
Although the findings of the "Killian Report" were
considered highly sensitive at the time, by the end of the
1950's, the government's intention to pursue a space-based
reconnaissance capability was openly acknowledged. For
example, Aviation Week ran a series of articles in 1959
describing the technical issues surrounding space-based
photoreconnaissance. These articles were based on a report
entitled "Fundamental Considerations of the Reconnaissance
from a Satellite," prepared by the Space Reconnaissance
Department of Allen B. DuPont Laboratories [see Ref. 33]. And
in 1960, in an unclassified hearing before the US House of
Representatives concerning "Defense Space Interests," the
Secretary of Defense acknowledged that the US Air Force had
been assigned the responsibility to develop a satellite
reconnaissance system, code-name SAMOS [Ref. 34:p. 10]. At
its inception, the SSRSP was, if not a "white" program, at
least "medium gray" [Ref. 7:p. 107].
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This changed abruptly with the onset of the Kennedy
Administration. In 1960, the Soviet Union began mounting
increasingly strident attacks on the legitimacy of US space-
based reconnaissance. Fearing a legal finding that satellite
overflights constituted a violation of international law,
President Kennedy's National Security Advisor ordered a
complete black-out on information about the fledgling SSRSP
in January 1961. In other words, the original motivation
behind classifying SSRSP operations was to "keep spy sats from
being shot down by political action." However, this black-
out was never intended to be indefinite. Once the political
and legal dangers facing space-based reconnaissance had been
removed, the responsible officials felt that the existence of
the SSRSP should be publicly acknowledged, and "explained in
terus of the overall objectives of, and necessity for that
program" [Ref. 35:pp. 346-348].
Unfortunately, the secrecy surrounding the SSRSP
assumed a life of its own. Such was the depth of security
that it was not until 1978 that government officials or
military officers could even acknowledge that US space-based
reconnaissance programs existed [Ref. 32:p. 123). And to this
day, the author knows of no official government publication
or document that explicitly acknowledges the missions of the
SSRSP.
In light of the many changes that have occurred since
1961, such stubborn failure to tout the national value of the
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SSRSP seems counterproductive. As early as 1963, the Soviet
Union had agreed in principle to legitimize observation from
space. This was for the simple reason that it, too, had
perfected reconnaissance satellites [Ref. 35:p. 348]. In any
event, commercial remote sensing satellites such as LandSat
and France's SPOT have established once and for all that
imaging from outer space without a target country's permission
does not constitute a violation of international law.
Moreover, several detailed books, among them William
Burrough's Deep Black [Ref. 7] and Jefferey Richelson's
America's Secret Eyes in Space [Ref. 36], have reported on
operations about the SSRSP. While the information contained
in these books may or may not be accurate in detail, both
clearly indicate the intent of the SSRSP. Based on the new
international security environment and the relaxation of
tensions with the Soviet Union, it would seem that the time
is right to "explain the SSRSP in terms of its overall
objectives." The NSSP is the logical means to this end.
C. NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE CAMPAIGN PLANS
1. General
During times of peace, the most important task facing
the national security space sector is to prepare for war. Of
course, some components of the sector, most notably the SSRSP
and the space combat support program, have important peacetime
roles. However, should war break out, the efforts of the
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entire sector would be brought to bear to speed its
termination. Peacetime activities of tIe security space
sector should therefore focus on achieving a high level of
training, flexibility in organization and equipment, an4 above
all, a close relationship with those it is designed to support
-- the warfighters [Ref. 37:p. 41]. Should these interrelated
goals be achieved, the stage will be set to truly integrate
space-based support into the combat operations of US fighting
forces.
Recall that the NSSP tasks the national security space
sector to develop "plans and architectures" to meet the space
support requirements of operational forces. Whether intended
or not, the sequence of this tasking is especially
appropriate. Plans play a fundamental role in the preparation
for war. Given the broad objectives of providing space-based
intelligence support to the NCA, space-based combat support
to US fighting forces, space mission support, and space-
related research and development, the next step is to plan
campaigns to reach them. For the purposes of this discussion,
a campaign plan is "a progressive sequence of attainable goals
to attain an objective within a specified time" [Ref. 37:p.
41].
National security space campaign plans aim to ease the
transition between the broad objectives outlined in the
(modified) NSSP and the four associated national security
space architectures. Each plan would focus the efforts of the
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proper decision makers on things such as training, education,
organizatioL., and equipment design or acquisition [Ref. 37:p.
411. Mtreover, they would provide important guidelines and
list any constraints for the development of their associated
national security space architectures. Just as the
architectures seek to establish unity of effort in the
accomplishment of a common mission, so too would the
combination of the four campaign plans forge cohesiveness
within the security space sector as a whole.
Logic and unity of effort dictate that during times of
war, DoD would assume control of all SSRSP on-orbit systems
as well as all space mission support operations. Therefore,
an important component of this sublevel is inter-program
coordination plans. These coordination plans would serve a
similar purpose to the inter-sector policies found at the
national policy sublevel.
2. The DoD Space Campaign Plan
The DoD Space Campaign Plan (DoDSCP), associated as
it is to the NSWA, would replace the DoD Military Space Policy
[Ref. 31). This policy seems redundant; with the exception
of providing more useful definitions of the four space mission
areas, it basically regurgitates information found in the
NSSP. It lacks any specific guidance on how services should
construct their own space warfighting plans and architectures;
it fails to prioritize national space missions; it contains
no information on training or education about space support;
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and it establishes no intermediate objectives or time lines
for the development of important space combat support
capabilities. The DoDSCP would cover these important items
and more, providing a clear starting point for the development
of a NSWA. In addition, the DoDSCP would consolidate and
include as its appendices the numerous publications that now
cover space-based support; i.e., the JTENS manual [Ref. 8].
3. The National Intelligence Community Space Campaign
Plan
The National Intelligence Community Space Campaign
Plan (NICSCP) would cover, in addition to peacetime operations
of the SSRSP, the intended roles and missions of the SSRSP
during times of war. Due to the extraordinary sensitivity of
these operations, a large part of the NICSCP would be
compartmented. However, for the TENCAP attitude to be
overcome the NIC must be more forthcoming about its basic
combat support capabilities. It is true that great strides
have been made in the past several years in making more of the
information derived from the SSRSP available for exploitatior
by the combat forces. But how can one expect national
reconnaissance capabilities to be fully integrated into combat
operations if even the must rudimentary knowledge about SSRSP
assets is denied to the fighting forces? For example, naval
officers can read about specific capabilities of Soviet
reconnaissance systems in the Naval Space Master Plan -- at
the SECRET level. This knowledge is critical to integrate
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evasion and deception tactics into daily naval operations.
Meanwhile, any explicit reference to US overhead
reconnaissance platforms is compartmented! As long as
policies such as this persist, doubts like those expressed by
Captain Walters in Chapter I will be difficult to overcome.
It should be stressed that the author is in no way
advocating an open-ended release of sensitive information
regarding the specific operations of SSRSP. But restricted
release of general capabilities seems long overdue. Top
officials now routinely refer to overhead assets. For
example, Air Force General Donald Hard, the Air Force's
Director of Space and Strategic Defense Initiative programs,
outlined in an August 1990 speech a program named "Constant
Source." The program involves using special mobile terminals
to provide tactical commanders with overhead imagery in near
real time [Ref. 38:p. 1]. Moreover, the general capabilities
of some space systems are widely known. The Soviet Union now
offers commercial satellite photography with two-meter
resolution [Ref. 39:p. 1], and expects to offer synthetic
aperture radar imagery with 15-meter resolution in July 1990
[Ref. 40:p. 8]. And several digital irges taken from US
space sensors have either been leaked or published, providing
ample evidence about their existence, clarity, and
sophistication [see for example Ref. 32:pp. 138-141].
If these facts were not enough, the Soviet Union
obtained a technical manual of one of the most modern US
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photoreconnaissance satellites. Dr. Leslie Dirks, head of the
CIA Directorate responsible for developing the satellite, has
said that the manual contained the satellite's:
characteristics, capabilities, and limitations...
describes the process of photography employed and
illustrates the quality of photos and the process used
in passing the product along to the users of the
system.. .and describes the limitation in geographic
coverage. [Ref. 7:p. 22]
In this author's opinion, the benefit of withholding
information that is readily available to the enemy is not
worth the increased level of doubt it engenders in the
warfighting forces. A NICSCP would seem to be the most
logical place to provide this information.
4. The National Space Support Campaign Plan
The National Space Support Campaign Plan (NSSCP) would
outline all relevant guidelines concerning the launch,
operation, and maintenance of national security space systems.
The plan would cover such things as time lines for
availability of new launch or other support systems; education
requirements for space support officers; and specific space
support capabilities such as launch system availability and
turn-around times, on-orbit sparing, etc. The aim of the
plan, like the NICSCP, would be to focus in on how space
mission support operations interact with and support the
wartime functions of the NSWA.
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5. The National Space Research, Development, and
Acquisition Campaign Plan
The National Space Research, Development, and
Acquisition Campaign Plan (NSRDACP) would outline all combat
support functions that could be feasibly accomplished from
space. As such, it would serve as a sounding board for space-
based combat support concepts. The NSRDACP would also cover
such diverse subjects as technology transfer, contracting, and
design guidelines. It would also develop timelines for the
initial operating capabilities of space assets developed to
support the aforementioned "operational" architectures. An
additional function might be to track world-wide space
technology development, and to make recommendations to the NIC
as to when compartmentation of specific space technologies
could be discontinued without jeopardizing national security.
6. Inter-campaign Coordination Plans
Inter-campaign coordination plans would be absolutely
critical to ensure the nation, . security space sector's
transition from peacetime to wartime operations. These plans,
should include, at a minimum, concrete guidelines outlining
the transfer of control of SSRSP assets to DoD in times of
crisis. The plans should also explicitly state expected
allocations of wartime space-based combat support. For
example, assume the SSRSP is capable of provide x images per
day. Inter-program plans should set the tentative number of
images that would be allocated in support of strategic,
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operational, and tactical commanders (to be fully defined
later). This would in turn allow the services and the
warfighting commanders to plan on how to best utilize the
images on a force-wide basis, and help to build realistic
expectations about the availability of space-based support.
Another important component of these plans would be
peacetime exercise guidelines. To test DoD procedures for the
assumption of control of all US security space assets -- to
include those of the SSRSP as well as appropriate commercial
and civil spacecraft -- inter-program plans would include
national level space support exercises. Such exercises, made
in conjunction with peacetime military operations, would
identify control problems and other shortfalls in the NSWA,
increase the confidence of combat commanders about the
availability of space-based support, and allow the services
to fine tune their individual space warfighting doctrines.
D. SUMMARY
Before a National Space Warfighting Architecture can be
built, two important questions must be answered: what are its
design missions and how is it related to other national
security space architectures? Figure 2 provides a visual
summary and review of the author's answer to these questions.
Although the NSWA is only one of four interrelated
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equals. Its baseline combat missions, derived from an analysis
of the NSSP, include force enhancement, space control, and
force application. It seems clear that these missions drive
the requirements of both the Space Mission Support and Space
Research, Development, and Acquisition Architectures. And in
times of war, the SSRSA should become an integral part of the
warfighting architecture. Therefore, the development of a NSWA
would seem to be a logical first step toward the integration
of space-based combat support into the daily operations of
terrestrial combat forces.
Having fashioned the first two of the NSWA's nine
essential building blocks, it is now time to begin on the
third. The next order of business is therefore to consider
the NSWA's unique and dangerous operating environment: war.
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IV. WAR: THE DESPERATE GAMBLE
War is a matter of vital importance to the state; the
province of life and death; the road to survival or
ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studies.
[Ref. 41:p. 63]
Sun Tzu, 4th Century, B.C.
A. INTRODUCTION
For all of its impressive technical capabilities, the
national security space constellation is not about science or
technology. Discussions about orbital configurations, ground
footprints, resolution limits and signal fidelity, while
important, miss the crux of its mission. The national
security space constellation is about war -- either to aid in
its prevention or to agsist in its termination. To be useful,
a National Space Warfighting Architecture must therefore
focus on war and warfighting concepts. The purpose of this
chapter is to provide a short look at the nature of war. The
ideas presented herein will guide the later development of
warfighting concepts that can be used to build the framework
for a relevant and practical National Space Warfighting
Architecture.'
'The conceptual guide for this chapter and the next is the
Marine Corps' doctrinal treatise on war, FMFM-I. Warfighting.
Although many of the thoughts contained herein are similar to those




Webster defines war as "open armed conflict between
nations or states, or between parties in the same state,
carried on by force of arms for various purposes" [Ref. 19:p.
2059]. However, this traditional definition falls to capture
war's true essence. Although his writings are now over 150
years old, Carl von Clausewitz seems to capture this essence
best:
I shall not begin by formulating a crude, journalistic
definition of war, but go straight to the heart of the
matter, to the duel. War is nothing more than but a
duel on a larger scale. Countless duels go to make
up war, but a picture of it as a whole can be formed
by imagining a pair of wrestlers. Each tries through
physical force to compel the other to do his will; his
immediate aim is to throw his opponent in order to
make him incapable of further resistance. War is thus
an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will
(original emphasis).
[Ref. 42:p. 75]
While this oft-quoted analogy is rich in meaning, it
represents Clausewitz's view of war's theoretical extreme.
Clausewitz later writes:
If we now consider briefly the subjective nature of
war -- the means by which war has to be fought -- it
will look more than ever like a gamble.. .From the very
start there is an interplay of possibilities,
probabilities, good luck and bad that weaves its way
through the length and breadth of the tapestry. In
the whole range of human activities, war most closely
resembles a game of cards (emphasis added).
[Ref. 42:pp. 85-86]
Taken together, these two simple yet elegant passages
point toward a more meaningful definition of war. War is a
clash involving the use and threat of armed violence between
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two living forces, each possessing independent, implacable and
irreconcilable wills, and both subject to the skill,
guesswork, and luck associated with any game of chance. The
larger "duel" of war, the gamble, is made up of countless
smaller duels, the individual hands of cards. While the
outcome of a specific hand may not impinge on the gamble's
final outcome, the cumulative effect of all hands most
certainly does. War becomes a straightforward attempt to win
the gamble -- to impose one's will on another -- by making the
opponent incapable of further play. There are two ways to
accomplished this aim. The first is to physically take the
opponent's stake -- through the overt use of military force.
The second is to psychologically take the opponent's stake
-- through the bluff or threat of military force.
The view of war as a contest between two "living forces"
vice two nations may be more appropriate now than even
Clausewitz intended. Some theorists envision a new generation
of war that will be fought outside the familiar nation-state
framework. In their view, a nonnational entity, united by
ideology, religion, or greed, may become the most likely enemy
in the future. "The "Drug War" is offered as an example to
support this theory [Ref. 43:p. 26].
The appearance of nonnational enemies will only increase
the probability that states of war -- defined as formal
political declarations of armed hostilities between two or
more nations -- will be less likely in the future. The US
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has declared war only five times in its history, the last
being World War II [Ref. 37 :p. 793. Since that time, American
forces have fought in two major undeclared wars and have been
involved in numerous smaller conflicts. The definition of war
as a clash between two hostile wills that involves the use and
threat of armed violence and is subject to the effects of
chance is an enduring one.
C. WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY
War is not pastime; it is no mere joy in daring and
winning, no place for irresponsible enthusiasts. It
is a serious means to a serious end, and all of its
colorful resemblance to a game of chance... (is) merely
its special characteristic. [Ref. 42:p. 86]
For all of his elegant analogies, Clausewitz recognized
that war is "a serious means to a serious end;" it is not
fought for its own sake. For an armed clash to occur, some
motive must drive the two opponents toward an irreconcilable
and violent argument. The driving motive can be found in the
political aims of the opponents, which are mutually perceived
as hostile. War's political aims determine both the military
objectives and the amount of effort and resources expended by
each side. The single most important factor that moderates
war's violent theoretical extreme is that war is a "political
instrument, a continuation of political activity by other
means" [Ref. 42:pp. 80-87].
Clausewitz saw the total phenomenon of war as a
"remarkable trinity," consisting of a nation's people, its
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government, and its commanders and armies. The people are the
source of the war's passion, a "blind natural force" that
provides war with its motive. They decide when to risk the
gamble and are avid followers of its progress. The commander
and his army are responsible for playing the individual hands
over the course of the game. They, more than any other, feel
the pressure of facing a skilled and determined opponent, as
well as the unpredictable impact of chance and luck.
Governments are xesponsible for the "rational" side of war
-- its political aims. They set the gamble's perceived
realistic goals, allocate stakes among players, placate the
people when luck runs bad, and restrain commanders when luck
turns good. Their ultimate responsibility is to decide when
it's in the nation's best interest to start and quit the
gamble [Ref. 44:p. 97].
Once again, Clausewitz's talent for analogies brings out
the fundamental importance of war's policy aims. War is
largely an irrational act. It is one part passion, one part
chance, and one part reason; two of its three elements are by
definition unrestrained and unpredictable. Without the
guiding moderation of reason, expressed in the political
objectives fashioned by the government, the unbridled power
of the people's passions or the reckless betting by
warfightiny commanders might very well cause mortal damage to
a nation's interests [Ref. 44:pp. 97-98].
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D. THE GAMBLE'S KEY ACTOR: THE COMMANDER
1. The Commander in War
In Clausewitz's remarkable trinity, the people stoke
the passionate engine of war, the government lays the track
of national interest, but only the commander decides how to
drive the engine in combat [Ref. 44:p. 100]. As a result, the
violent competition between opposing warfighting commanders
can often be viewed as a microcosm of war. Be it a strategic
commander-in-chief or a squad leader, a commander finds
himself across the "gambling table" from a determined and
skilled opponent with an identical goal: to make his enerl,
incapable of further play. How the warfighting leader plays
his cards often determines the fate of both the people and
their government. Theoretical studies of war, the Sun Tzu to
Clausewitz, have therefore, focused on the commander and his
role in war's gamble. This thesis will follow suit.
Focusing on the commander's role in war serves two
further important purposes. First, command has been defined
as a "function that has to be exercised, more or less
continuously, if an anay is to exist and operate...Few other
function.. .are as important in both respects, existence and
operation" [Ref. 45:p. 5]. Concepts based on command are
relevant to all services, at every echelon of leadership, and
for all types of warfare. S-cond, focusing on a commander,
rather than some abstract "living force," drives home the
essential importance of the human dimension in war:
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It is the human dimension which infuses war with its
intangible moral factors. War is shaped by human
nature and is subject to the complexities,
inconsistences, and peculiarities which characterize
human behavior. Since war is an act of violence based
on irreconcilable differences, it will invariably
inflame and be shaped by human emotions.
[Ref. 37:p. 10]
2. The First Law of Command: Win Quickly
It bears repeating that for all of its similarities to
a gamble, war has vast additional different qualities. For
this reason: the "chips" are men's lives and a nation's
future. The result of hands both won and lost is violence,
death, and widespread suffering. Therefore, the first and
foremost law of command is to win the gamble as quickly as
possible. Although over 2500 years old, Sun Tzu's words are
still relevant:
Thus, while we have heard of blundering swiftness in
war, we have not yet seen a clever operation that was
prolonged.... Hence, what is essential in war is
victory, not prolonged operation. And therefore a
general who understands war is the minister of the
people's fate, and arbiter of the nation's destiny.
[Ref. 41:pp. 73 and 76]
3. The Second Law of Command: You Can't Win If You Don't
Play
After all the posturing, betting, and bluffing is
done, a gamble is decided by the play of the cards. And so
it is in war. In the end, there is only one means toward
victory: battle. Armed conflict may arise out of the clash
between two hostile political entities, each bent on imposing
his own desires or values on the other; it may involve entire
alliances of nations or merely parties within the same state;
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it may be of long duration or consist of a short, violent
explosion. In any case, a fundamental concept of war is that
everything must "originally derive from combat...The end for
which a soldier is recruited.. .armed and trained, the whole
object of his.. .marching is simply that he should fight at the
right time and place" [Ref. 42:p. 95). To win a gamble
quickly, at the very least a commander must understand the
nuances of the game, and effectively play his hands. In other
words, he must understand the factors that shape the climate
of combat and survive the storm of battle.
E. THE CLIMATE OF COMBAT
1. The Atmosphere of War: Chance
The climate of combat is modulated and formed in the
very atmosphere that pervades the gamble: chance. Chance is
the inexplicable or random event whose cause is either
inapparent cr unconnected to its effects [Ref. 44:p. 104].
While its touch is felt in all of life's endeavors, its
effects are especially felt in war: "No other human activity
is so universally bound up with chance," and therefore,
"guesswork and luck play a great part in war" [Ref. 42:p. 85].
As a result, the best dealt hand, no matter how skillfully or
forcefully played, may still not be enough in the eyes of
"lady luck," the neutral arbiter of the gamble.
There are two basic responses to chance's presence in
war. The first is that it is unwelcome, an "intruder" that
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conspires to interfere with the quest for victory [Ref. 42:p.
101]. A commander is expected to do everything possible to
minimize its impact on the gamble's final outcome. As a
result, this view often embraces rules or systems that, if
diligently applied, should "guarantee" victory. These rules
rest upon the notion that war, like nature, proceeds according
to certain regularities [Ref. 46:p. 41]. Chance, when it
strikes, serves only to magnify the more serious mistake of
misapplying or misunderstanding these regularities. In the
first view, victory in war is seen less as a product of a
commander's triumphant will and more the predictable outcome
of rules well applied.
The second view is based on the belief that a
commander's unique decisions are more important to war's
outcome than to his mindless application of a list of simple
rules. Instead of a betrayer of hopes and plans, chance is
seen as the bearer of opportunities to quick victory, and is
therefore welcomed, even relished, by a receptive and creative
leader [Ref. 44:p. 98]. This view sees war as a such a
complex and unpredictable undertaking, so intertwined with the
peculiarities of chance and the time and place of each
encounter, that attempts to establish maxims or rules
according to which war proceeds and should be followed are
pointless [Ref. 46:p. 41]. In the second view, the outcome
of war turns directly on the character of the commander, which
determines the "scope which the play of courage and talent
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will enjoy in the realm of probability and chance"
[Clausewitz, as cited in Ref. 44:p. 97]. The author
subscribes to this second view of chance. That view will
predominate in the ideas and concepts presented in this
thesis.
2. War's Climatic Variables
The climate of war comprises five different variables.
The variables are ever-present, but also ever-changing, and
therefore unpredictable. They are: armed violence, danger,
exertion, (the commander's) uncertainty, and friction.
The climate of war is characterized by armed violence.
War is a violent collision between two implacable opposing
wills -- where there is only one will there is massacre, not
combat [Ref. 45:p. 266]. It is the violent interaction and
interplay between these two opposing wills that, more than any
other variable, shapes the unpredictable nature of the combat
climate:
The...attribute of military action is that it must
expect positive reactions, and the process of
interaction that results. Here we are not concerned
with the problem of calculating such reaction... but
rather with the fact that the very nature of
interaction is bound to make it unpredictable. The
effect that any measure will have on the enemy is the
mort singular factur among all the particulars of
action. [Ref. 42:p. 139]
Danger is a direct reflection of the climate's level
of violence. Its human manifestation is fear -- the
debilitating, psychological reaction to the ever-present
possibility that war's gamble will be lost. In combat, there
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are two types of danger and, therefore, two types of fear.
The first type of danger is to one's self, when the stakes
literally involve one's life. Fear in this case is the
personal uncertainty and doubt that one will survive the
gamble. Its cure is found in personal courage, which is not
the absence of fear, but the inner, psychological strength to
overcome it [Ref. 37:p. 12].
The second type of danger is to others; it occurs when
a fighter is forced to risk men's lives or his nation's future
in pursuit of victory. Fear in this case, is the commander's
burden, the agonizing doubt that his plan is worthy of the
stakes. Its cure is found in the courage to accept
responsibility. A commander must possess both types of
courage to succeed in war: with the first he overcomes his
personal fear and accepts a seat in war's gamble; but only
with the second is he able to impose a decision on his
opponent (Ref. 42:p. 101]. As Sun Tzu said, "If courageous,
(a general) gains victory by seizing opportunity without
hesitation... If a general is not courageous, he will be unable
to conquer doubts or create great plans" [Ref. 41:p. 65].
The third variable, exertion, reflects the demands of
prolonged exposure to war's inhospitable climate. War imposes
brutal physical and mental hardships on its participants;
indeed the two are directly related. Physical exertion and
lack of rest during combat lead quickly to physical
exhaustion, which magnifies mens' perceptions of danger and
feelings of fear. The result is a sapping of mens' will to
fight. S.L.A. Marshall describes this cycle quite vividly in
his book Men AQainst Fire [see Ref. 47]. Again, though
exertion affects all combatants, it imposes special demands
on the commander. The commander must always be aware of his
army's limit of endurance, and he must have the special
courage to push his men to this limit when necessary; the
strength of will to drive men beyond this limit when victory
is near; and the intelligence to know when opportunities must
be foregone to allow his men the chance to recuperate [Ref.
42:p. 115].
Next to the enemy, uncertainty is the most serious
obstacle that a commander must conquer if he is to function,
much less flourish, in the climate of war. This uncertainty
is separate from the doubt caused by fear, although both fear
of death and fear to take responsibility combine to heighten
its effects. Nor is it the uncertainly associated with
chance, since chance is unpredictable and largely
unmanageable. It is the uncertainty inherent in the violent,
dangerous, and exhausting game or war, as the commander weighs
his own hand and considers his opponent's possible moves
against him. Uncertainty is the commander's psychological
state of discomfort from confusion or lack of information
about his enemy [Ref. 44:p. 104].
Quick victory would be relatively assured if a leader
is lucky enough to know his enemy's hand, but few opponents
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are obliged to tip their cards. Before a commander acts, he
is compelled to gather what information is available about the
enemy's playing style, the strengths of the enemy and friendly
hands, the potential place of the gamble, and the overall
risks of playing. Command can thus be seen as a quest for
certainty: certainty about the strength and intentions of the
enemy's forces; certainty about the position and state of
friendly forces; and certainty about the exact place and time
where the battle may be joined [Ref. 45:p. 264].
But certainty is elusive. Says Clausewitz, "War is
the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on
which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater
or lesser uncertainty" [Ref. 42:p. 101]. This is the so-
called fog of war, the impenetrable haze which ensures that
a commander's plans will be based on incomplete and inaccurate
impressions about his foe. The best any commander can do is
to gather as much information as possible within a limited
period of time, to weigh is own hand, and to predict his
enemy's intentions and actions. How many cards did he take?
Is he disposed to bluff? How critical would the loss of a
single hand affect the outcome of the gamble? Based on the
answers to these questions and the risks they entail, the
commander devises a plan and acts accordingly.
A commander's plan reflects one of four responses to
uncertainty. The first is manifested by a fear to take
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responsibility, the lack of will to predict the enemy's course
of action or to devise a strategy:
...a general unable to estimate his capabilities...
when faced with the opportunity to engage the enemy
will advance in a stumbling manner, looking anxiously
first to his right and then to his left, and be unable
to produce a plan. [Ref. 41:p. 87]
The second response is made by a commander who has
little knowledge of the enemy or his playing style, but who
has the courage to accept responsibility and to put aside
concern for what cannot be controlled. The mental act of
leaving inevitable contingencies to chance frees his energies
to concentrate on dictating the action. This response is an
explicit rejection of passivity. It is based on Napoleon's
advice to "Engage the enemy and see what happens" [Ref. 44:p.
108]. The rejection of passivity is a daring act in its own
right; since the commander bases his plans only on his own
hand and the neutral element of chance, he willingly accepts
fifty-fifty odds on winning the gamble [Ref. 41:p. 84).
A bold response is the response of a "card counter."
No commander can guarantee victory. But the warfighter who
has indications that the enemy's hand is weak, has knowledge
and confidence in his own cards, and who has paid meticulous
attention to preceding hands, is often willing to "up the
ante" to take advantage of favorable opportunities that arise
during play. Boldness is a daring "bet," tempered with
judgment, backed up by the special courage to risk more to
gain more. Boldness combines the courage to accept
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responsibility and creativity to exploit a fleeting chance for
victory. It "must be granted a certain power over and above
successful calculations involving space, time, and magnitude
of forces, for where it is superior, it will take advantage
of an opponent's weakness." In other words, it is a
"genuinely creative force" [Clausewitz, cited in Ref. 37:p.
34].
A reckless response is the dark side of boldness. It
is the sign of a commander who believes chance is fair as well
as random. Since chance produces runs of events that tend to
even out over time, a reckless commander is willing to bet the
lives of his men and the outcome of the gamble that this
"evening out" will occur on the next play [Ref. 44:p. 110].
Although chance may occasionally smile upon such schemes,
recklessness represents an unjustifiable risk, wholly unworthy
of the responsibility invested in a warfighting leader.
Senior commanders owe it to their men to ruthlessly remove
fighting leaders who exhibit reckless behavior.
If uncertainty presents the foremost obstacle to the
development of a commander's plan, then friction presents the
greatest obstacle to his plan's successful execution. Even
if a commander has the courage to accept responsibility, has
correctly guessed the enemy's hand, and has boldly planned to
exploit the situation, there is no guarantee that his play
will conform to his plan. An improper bet, an inappropriate
discard, or a revealing glance of his cards may conspire to
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disrupt his intended playing strategy. This is friction, the
"force that makes the apparently easy so difficult" in combat
(Ref. 42:p. 121].
Friction is the decremental loss of effort or
intention caused by human fallibility, compounded by danger
and physical exertion. Just like its mechanical counterpart,
friction is the phenomenon that reduces the efficiency of the
commander's war machine. Friction is itself a serious
inhibitor of combat performance, but when operating within an
atmosphere of chance, it can be amplified in random,
unpredictable ways that can turn a simple mistake into a
serious crisis. While a good commander makes every effort to
minimize friction, he does not try to eliminate the
inevitable. Friction sets limits on what can or cannot be
done in combat, and the successful commander will make simple
plans with these limits set firmly in mind. Moreover, he
expects and anticipates the intervention of chance on
friction, and stands ready to meet the resulting crises calmly
and decisively (Ref. 44:pp. 104-105].
3. Disorder: The Climate of Combat
Disorder is nothing less than the climate of combat,
the unique mixture in time of war's five climatic variables
within the overall atmosphere of chance. The combat climate
is nonquanitifiable; its patterns are unpredictable and
capricious. Indeed, since each of its five climatic factors
are in constant flux and chance is forever an unpredictable
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quantity, disorder represents the infinite range of
environments within which men have and will fight.
Make no mistake: the combat climate is the most
dangerous, least hospitable place known to man. Within its
confines the light is dim and misleading; the atmosphere
oppressive and threatening; the movement difficult and slow.
Disorder is what Clausewitz dubbed "general friction," the
thing that impedes and fights the commander's progress toward
his objectives [Ref. 42:p. 122). Viewed in another way,
disorder is the primary obstacle in the way of forging a
commander's plan of action, as well as the direct cause of a
plan's natural disintegration once the combat joined. It is
the factor that caused the elder von Moltke to state that "No
plan survives first contact with the enemy" [Moltke, cited in
Ref. 48].
Like the atmosphere that shapes it, the climate of
combat is a neutral surrounding -- it affects operations of
friendly and enemy units alike. The longer opponents dwell
within in, the greater the tendency toward chaos on both
sides. Orders are misinterpreted or lost; expected actions
do not take place or are bungled; newer, more certain
information is received; or attractive opportunities arise
that were neither predicted nor prepared for. Under these
circumstances, a commander must be flexible enough to modify
his original plans to exploit the inevitable, fleeting new
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chances that arise in the swirling, changing currents of the
climate (Ref. 37:p. 9]. As German commanders were told:
Once a decision is made, do not deviate, except for
excellent reasons. In this connection, however, one
can bring about disaster by obstinately clinging to
the initial decision when justifiable grounds are
present for change. The true art of leadership is the
ability to recognize when a new decision is required
by the developments or changes to the situation. The
commander should be resolute but not obstinate.
[Ref. 49:p. 29]
Rather than becoming a helpless spectator, buffeted by the
changing currents of disorder, a commander willing to follow
this advice is able to "ride the wind," and to operate, even
flourish, within the disorderly climate of combat.
F. THE STORM OF BATTLE
1. War's Means of Decision
For a commander entruated with the responsibility to
play in war's gamble, the moment of truth comes with the play
of the cards. A successful commander is one who, through the
skillful use of threats and acts of violence, compels his
enemy to withdraw or capitulate. The means toward these ends
are the storms of battle. Battles are the stepping stones
that lead to either victory or defeat in the gamble; where
there are no battles there is confrontation, not war. In
other words, storms of battle are war's final means of
decision.
Battle storms form within the climate of combat at a
specific place and time. As such, chance and the five
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climatic variables mix turbulently within their confines. But
storms of battle are marked by higher levels of violence and
cover more localized areas in time and space than the global,
more constant combat climate. Just as the combat climate is
marked by an infinite range of fighting environments, so too
are battle storms marked by an infinite range of violence.
One may resemble a tornado, a seething cauldron of almost
unimaginable power and destruction; another just an
approaching front, threatening violence to come. In any case,
it is into the storm that a commander must order or lead his
men if he is to win war's gah~blc.
2. Technology and the Scope of Battle
Two general measures of a battle storm's scope are its
size and duration. The larger the geographic area touched by
the fury of the storm, the longer its effects are felt by
combatants, the higher its scope. Military history reveals
that the size and length of battle storms have grown
inexorably larger and longer. To understand this clear trend,
it is necessary to consider the impact of technology in and
on the storm of battle.
Clausewitz resisted any tendency to include material
considerations in his writings on war. He said, "It is clear
that weapons and equipment are not essential for the concept
of fighting" [Ref. 42:p. 127]. Insofar as "fighting" is
defined as a clash between two hostile wills, involving the
use of armed force, and subject to the element of chance, then
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Clausewitz was certainly right. War, at its essential core,
is immutable and unchanging. Regardless of the material means
used to pursue war's aims, chance, the climate of combat, and
the storm of battle have defined the environment in which men
have always fought. But clearly, technology has had some
impact on war, and it is on the scope of battle that its
effects have been most felt.
Battlefields are now more sprawling than Clausewitz
could ever have imagined. On land, combat units have had to
disperse to survive the effects of accurate, long-range, and
lethal fire. The number of square meters per man in battle
has grown by a factor of 400 since Clausewitz's time and by
1.45 since World War II [Ref. 45:D. 277]. On sea and in the
air, the sheer size of the battlespace and similar abilities
to target and engage forces from long range have opened the
distance between opposing and among friendly units. This
continuous, expanding pattern of dispersion has increased the
breadth of battle storms by orders of magnitude above those
of earlier times, and in the process, made its interior a
seemingly empty place. Death now comes suddenly from long
range, far from the view of the combatants, heightening their
feelings of danger and fear [Ref. 47:p. 63].
Technology has expanded the duration as well as the
breadth of battle storms. Night or adverse weather no longer
present the formidable natural barriers to continuous
operations as they have in the past. As a result, a storm's
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fuli fury can now blow around the clock for days on end,
offering little or no respite to combatants. Exertion is now
a more constant, continuous drag on men fighting within the
storm, increasing and prolonging their physical exhaustion,
and thereby intensifying the effects of friction.
Battlefield dispersion and the elimination of two of
war's natural barriers have combined to create battle storms
of incredible scope. In the process, the levels of disorder
within the storm are now so high and over such wide areas that
the distribution between front and rear, and friendly or
enemy-controlled territory, are blurred. Within the storm
there are pockets of "heavy air," local concentrations of both
friendly and enemy forces, and "light air," voids of
relatively low concentrations. The turbulent currents of
battle toss and intermix these pockets of force, creating
unoccupied areas, gaps, and exposed flanks. These weaknesses
offer paths to victory if they can be discerned through the
fog of war and subsequently exploited [Ref. 37:p. 9].
This is easier said than done. The magnitude of
disorder found within the breadth of the storm confounds
attempts to combine friendly forces or coordinate their
movement, quickly veils enemy vulnerabilities from view,
creates friendly weaknesses and precipitates crises, and often
causes unexpected, random collisions between combatants before
plans can be finalized. While these conditions have al\ays
been found within the storm of battle, technology has
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nevertheless caused a tremendous increase in areas affected
by these conditions, and has therefore, magnified the presence
of uncertainty, friction, and the effects of chance.
3. The Gamble's Fighting Rhythm
While a commander endeavors to win the gamble as
quickly as possible, the incredible intensities of battle
storms conspire to exhaust the opposing combatants. As a
result, commanders must carefully consider when they should
offer or participate in battle. War is therefore marked by
flurries of violent and intense hands involving many players,
followed by periods of introspection, planning, and
preparation. The hands merge with those that precede and
follow, creating the competitive flow and ebb of the gamble
[Ref. 37:p. 8]. Opposing commanders try to influence and
exploit the uneven rhythm of the gamble to their own
advantage, by quickly reacting to unforeseen, fleeting
opportunities. Successful commanders will, in large part, be
those able to adapt and prosper in the gamble's maddening,
trying, and competitive fighting rhythm.
G. THE ART OF WAR AND THE NATIONAL SPACE WARFIGHTING
ARCHITECTURE
In 1936, the German Army published an Army Service manual
entitled Truppenfuhrung -- Command of Troops. The
introduction of the manual starts with the following passage:
"War is an art, a free creative activity resting on scientific
foundations. It makes the highest demands on men's entire
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personality" [Ref. 50:p: 54]. To help understand this
statement, a simple analogy is helpful. Like a weatherman,
a commander has certain measurements and rules, based on the
laws of science, that he can use to predict patterns in the
climate of combat and to forecast the intensity of coming
storms. These predictions help the commander to prepare
himself and his forces for battle. But in the end, the
forecast is nothing more than a "hunch," a guess about iuture
conditions. And like the weather, once a storm hits, it is
a totally unique combination of war's climatic variables,
modified by chance, that may be totally different from what
the commander anticipated. Indeed, the commander may not even
have forecast its arrival. Success in the storm of combat
thus never turns on the simple application of scientific
rules, but instead on the art of prediction and adaptation in
the face of chance and disorder. As Sun Tzu said:
And as water shapes its flow in accordance with the
ground, so an army manages its victory in accordance
with the situation of the enemy. And as water has
not constant form, there are in war no constant
conditions. Thus one able to gain victory by
modifying his tactics in accordance with the enemy
situation may be said to be divine. [Ref. 41:p. 10]
Thus revealed, war is indeed an art, an activity of human
intuition, guesswork, and creativity, powered by character and
strength of will. The art of war is practiced by the
commander, who requires an ability to peer through the fog of
war and grasp the essence of a unique combat situation, the
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creative ability to devise a solution that accounts for the
friction of war, and the courage and strength of purpose to
see it through [Ref. 37:p. 15].
The view of war as art has an important practical impact
on this thesis, for it reveals the proper focus for a National
Space Warfighting Architecture. The art of war is in large
part the art of command. The NSWA should therefore have the
warfighting commander, be it the President, a Theater
Commander-in-Chief, or a MAGTF commander, as its first and
primary focus. The decision to pursue a national security
space capability is a policy decision approved by the
government and the people, and the resulting on-orbit
constellation represents a tremendous national investment in
time, money, and technological capability. But the
constellation does not exist for its own sake, and focusing
on its characteristics rather than its mission tends to
obscure this fundamental fact. The constellation exists for
one reason and one reason only: to provide direct support to
commanders entrusted with the responsibility to come to grips
with their uncertainty and master the opportunities offered
by the chance encounters that characterize war.
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V. WARFIGHTING CONCEPTS
After troops have crossed the borders, responsibility




Chapter IV describes war, the environment of the National
Space Warfighting Architecture. Building on the view of war
as a violent, disorderly gamble between two human wills, this
chapter develops key concepts that describe the practical art
of warfighting. The intent is to identify concepts that are
relevant to all levels and types of conflict; concepts that
can be used to provide a unifying theme within the framework
of NSWA. In the process, the author will continue to build
the common vocabulary necessary to the success of any
architecture.
B. DECISION AND ACTION: THE ENGINE OF WAR
War makes tremendous demands on all participants. Chance,
danger, exertion, and disorder are certainly not the sole
burden of the combat leader. Why then should the National
Space Warfighting Architecture have as its first and primary
focus the warfighting commander? For this reason: all
military actions, regardless of size, are based on commanders'
decisions. Outside the realm of chance, victory is a
reflection of sound decisions skillfully executed [Ref. 51:p.
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18]. However, as this last sentence implies, focusing on the
commander in no way means overlooking the role of his forces.
The two are inextricably linked. Indeed, steadfast, resolute,
and brave fighting men, representing the people and united in
a common purpose by their government, are the sole reason a
commander exists. Armies are a commander's weapon, the means
by which he can inflict damage to the enemy. But weapons,
however powerful, must still be aimed and fired to have any
effect. As Napoleon said, "It was not the legions which
crossed the Rubicon, but Caesar" [Ref. 45:p. i].
Decision by a "Caesar," action by his "legions." This,
in a nutshell, is the combat process that drives the engine
of war. War is nothing more than the relative outcome of the
combat action processes of two opposing wills. To better
understand this fundamental concept, it is time to
(temporarily) move out of the calculating environment of the
gambling hall and into the frightening and chaotic storm of
a raging gunfight.
The fight starts long before the exchange of bullets.
Opposing fighters jockey for position to increase the effects
of their weapons. Some elect to stay in easily defensible
positions with clear fields of fire. Others elect to move
toward their enemy to get off better, more accurate shots.
In any event, a gunfighter is always forced to consider the
enemies arrayed before him. Seldom will he have the
ammunition to shoot at every conceivable target. He therefore
81
is forced to select the most dangerous and most important
among them. He may choose to engage a single foe, perhaps
several; but he always targets the ones whose loss will hurt
the other side most, and always conserves his ammunition as
best he can. At some point, he brings these targets under
fire. He hopes to shoot at a time and from a position of his
choice, but he must be ready to fire or move to protect
himself if his enemy shoots first. Based on the damage he
inflicts on his opponents, the gunfighter may elect to refire
at his original targets, shoot at new targets that come within
range, move to a new position to better his aim, or hide and
reload. All the while enemy gunfighters are repeating similar
decision-action cycles, blazing away in return. These
repetitive, competitive cycles continue until one side is
unable or unwilling to sustain the fight.
The foregoing analogy depicts the complex interaction
between the combat action processes of two opposing forces.
More importantly, it helps to visualize what it takes to end
the duel -- the final aim of every war. Ultimately, the duel
is decided by only three things: the importance of targets
chosen by the opposing commanders; the damage caused to those
targets by the commanders: forces; and the relative ability
of the belligerents to continue the fight. Each of these
factors will be discussed in turn.
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C. TARGET SELECTION: THE SEARCH FOR A CRITICAL VULNERABILITY
1. A Target Defined
A commander's weapon has only so many bullets that can
be fired before he has to reload or give up the duel. He
therefore has two complementary goals in every gunfight: to
conserve his ammunition and to win the fight as quickly as
possible. The quickest way to gain an advantage and to
translate that advantage into an enemy's defeat is to identify
and destroy those targets that are most important to him.
Therefore, within the climate of combat and the storm of
battle, a commander always tries to locate and attack the
enemy's most critical vulnerability (Ref. 37:p. 303.
An enemy's critical vulnerability is often mistakenly
called his "center of gravity." Center of gravity -- the
German work is schwerpunkt -- is a key term used by
Clausewitz. Throughout most of his writings, he uses this
term to refer either to the armies of the belligerents (which
give the wrestlers in this famous analogy their centers of
gravity), or to the main concentrations of opposing armies on
the battlefield:
A center of gravity is always found where the mass is
concentrated most densely. It presents the most
effective target for a blow; furthermore, the heaviest
blow is that struck by the center of gravity... The
fighting forces of each belligerent...have a certain
unity and therefore.. .the analogy of the center of
gravity can be applied..Centers of gravity will be
found -,herever the forces are most concentrated
[Ref. 42 :p. 485-486].
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Unfortunately, in one part of his unfinished manuscript,
Clausewitz strays from his consistency and identifies other
possible centers of gravity, among them the "community of
interests" within an alliance and "public opinion in a popular
uprising" [Ref. 42:p. 596]. Both to prevent misunderstandings
and to retain the spirit of Clausewitz's schwerpunkt, centers
of gravity will be defined hereafter as a nation's or an
army's greatest concentration of combat force [Ref. 52 :p. 56].
A critical vulnerability is more encompassing than an
enemy's center of gravity. A commander who is successful in
destroying a critical vulnerability does decisive damage to
the enemy's continued ability to resist his will [Ref. 37:p.
35]. Whereas the loss of his schwerpunkt may temporarily
reduce an enemy's physical ability to weather the storm of
battle, it may not undermine his will to continue the war.
And until the enemy's will to resist is broken, the gamble
remains unwon. Thus defined, an alliance's community of
interests or public opinion are not centers of gravity, but
may be critical vulnerabilities.
Identifying and attacking an enemy's critical
vulnerability is easier said than done. The climate of combat
conspires to veil this vulnerability from a commander, or, by
providing only fleeting glimpses, to tantalize him to its
possible presence. Moreover, any competent enemy actively
tries to conceal and protect his most critical weakness.
Until this key weakness is uncovered, it is necessary to
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attack lesser vulnerabilities until a path to the enemy's
critical vulnerability is discovered [Ref. 37:p. 35].
2. The Policy Imperative and the Spectrum of Conflict
A commander's freedom to attack targets within the
storm of combat is determined by war's policy motive: "The
political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it,
and the means can never be considered in isolation from their
purposes" [Ref. 42:p. 87]. When the policy motive is intense
(extreme) -- such as the annihilation of the enemy -- the war
is more destructive and the commander's choice of targets is
less restricted. When the policy motive is less intense --
such as supporting a friendly government's counterinsurgency
-- the war is less destructive and the commander's choice of
targets is more restricted [Ref. 37:p. 20].
The spectrum of conflict is often used to graphically
portray the give and take between the intensity of the policy
motive and the commanderls freedom to select vulnerable
targets (see Figure 3). Types of conflict that share common
relationships between these two factors are placed along a
continuous curve, their relative position determined by the
conflict's overall level of destructiveness and the intensity
of its battlestorms. The most destructive end of the curve
represents the most intense policy motive and the least
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war. The least destructive end represents the least intense
policy motive and the most restrictive target selection
environment: a show of force.
When referring to conflicts with low overall levels of
destructiveness, it is now common to shorten "low intensity
policy conflict" to simply "low intensity conflict." This is
a mistake. Regardless of a conflict's policy motives, the
intensity of fighting inside its battlestorms is determined
by armed violence, danger, exertion, the density of opposing
forces, the tempo of operations, and the destructive potential
of the weapons involved. To a warfighter at the point of
contact between two forces, the battlefield seems infinitely
dense, the tempo quick, the danger close and real, the weapons
terrifyingly lethal. Here conflict is always high intensity.
Both to maintain the fundamental link between policy and war,
and to dispel any misconceptions about the intensity of
fighting -- any fighting -- on the individual warfighter, the
term low intensity policy conflict will be used to describe
war at the "low end" of the conflict spectrum.
The practical means by which a commander's freedom of
action is limited is by the use of rules of engagement
(ROE's). Generally, the less intense the policy motive, the
more prevalent or restrictive the ROE's. Because ROE's often
protect obvious enemy vulnerabilities from attack, warfighters
resent their presence, especially within the violent storm of
battle [see for example Ref. 53:p. 14). However, ROE's seldom
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protect an enemy's critical vulnerability. If they do, there
is a fundamental contradiction in the war's policy aim. Since
ROE's represent the link between a war's policy motive and the
individual warfighter, an ROE that prevents an attack upon an
enemy's critical vulnerability is a symptom that the war's
ends are at odds with its means.
3. The Levels of War (Command)
The spectrum of conflict helps to categorize a
commander's freedom to attack perceived vulnerabilities. It
is valid for any echelon of command. But different echelons
of command perceive enemy vulnerabilities in different ways.
To highlight these differences, it is helpful to talk about
the levels of war, or for the purpose of this discussion, the
levels ot command.
The highest level of command is occupied by the
strategic commander-in-chief -- the nation's supreme wartime
leader. He is responsible to the government and the people
for winning the gamble of war. He is concerned first and
foremost with war's policy aims and how the nation's military
forces, in conjunction with any allied forces, can best
achieve them. In this regard, he has four main tasks.
First, he selects what he perceives to be the enemy's
critical vulnerability. At this high level of command the
most vulnerable target is always a leg of the enemy's
"remarkable trinity." It may be the most powerful leader, or
perhaps a powerful opposition party, within the opposing
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government. It may be the public opinion supporting the war.
Perhaps it is the enemy's strategic center of gravity, or his
industrial capacity, or some key technological inferiority.
In any event, no coherent national (or allied) plan of action
can follow until this vulnerability is identified.
Second, the CINC (in conjunction with his allies)
devises a strategy to attack or exploit this critical
vulnerability. The strategy is reflected in the number of
individual card players that will represent him at war's
"gambling table," the restrictions he imposes upon their style
of play, and the complementary and supporting roles he assigns
each player. In practice, the card players represent the
commanders of theaters of war2; the restrictions are reflected
in appropriate ROE's; and the roles are defined by the
specific objectives assigned to each theater commander.
Third, the CINC provides each theater commander with
a "stake" -- combat forces -- sufficient to accomplish their
assigned goals. The stakes are drawn from the national pool
of economic and military power, as provided by the government
and the people. The CINC divides the sum total of national
military power into theater component commands, noncombatant
force groupings composed of similar types of fighting units
More accurately, the card players represent the Unified and
Specified commanders. However, for the purposes of this thesis,
the author chooses to concentrate on the unified commanders
responsible for theaters of war.
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(naval, air, ground combat, etc.), and his strategic forces
and reserves. He then allocates these stakes to the theater
commanders according to his overall strategy of play.
Finally, the strategic CINC practices the art and
science of winning wars. At this level of command, the storm
of battle is marked by distant thunder; the strategic CINC is
most concerned with shaping the broad climate of war in his
nation's favor. Once the war begins, the CINC adds or
subtracts players, shifts stakes among the players, and
coordinates overall play to unmask and attack the enemy's
critical vulnerability. He may elect to allocate most of his
"chips" to one dominant player to attack this key weakness
directly, or he may elect to apportion his chips more evenly
and attack the weakness indirectly. Regardless, all of his
decisions and moves are aimed at destroying this strategic
critical vulnerability as quickly as possible.
The I yers at the tables, the theater CINC's, are
strategic warfighting commanders. Despite their title, the
theater commanders act more like gamblers than gunfighters.
They are responsible to the strategic CINC for playing the
actual hands of cards dealt in war's gamble. Theater CINC's
use their component commands in appropriate combinations to
form their "bets" -- strategic centers of gravity -- while
playing the opposing theater commander. A theater CINC often
decides to divide his assigned stake and play multiple hands
against the enemy commander. He assigns subordinate leaders,
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responsible for theaters of operations, to play these hands.
Theater CINC's thus command in much the same way as the
strategic CINC: they devise complementary subordinate goals,
allocate forces appropriate to those goals, and coordinate
overall play to win the theater gamble. Although closer to
the sounds of thunder and subject to the effects of the
largest and most violent battlestorms, they are most concerned
with shaping the theater climate of combat.
A theater CINC tries to identify the critical
vulnerability that will most help him to impose his will on
the enemy theater commander. But the destruction of the
enemy's critical vulnerability must do more than just win the
theater duel. It must in some way unmask or exacerbate the
enemy's key strategic weakness or it serves no real purpose
in war. Therefore, a theater CINC's warfighting strategy is
always guided and influenced by the key vulnerability
identified by the strategic commander. Using this key
weakness as his guide, a theater CINC can exploit fleeting
opportunities or attack lesser vulnerabilities in such a way
as to securely tie all military action in-theater to war's
broader policy aims.
Intermediate command and action processes occur at the
operational level of war. Theaters of operations, when
activated by the theater CINC, are an organizational example
of operational command. To better understand this
intermediate level of command and action, it would help to
91
first explore the role played by war's lowest command level
-- the tactical commanders.
Tactical commanders are gunfighters -- calculating
gunfighters -- but gunfighters nonetheless. They are far less
concerned with policy motives, except as they are expressed
as ROE's, and far more concerned with defeating an enemy
within the storm of battle. In other words, they practice the
art and science of winning battles and engagements (Ref. 37:p.
23]. En '$s are clashes between opposing units, usually
division size or smaller. They may be anticipated by at least
one of the opposing sides, or may result from random
collisions between forces on a disorderly battlefield (a
"meeting" engagement). Engagements may or may not precipitate
a battle -- a longer, more violent storm consisting of a
series of related engagements that is characterized by higher
scope, disorder, and intensity [Ref. 54:pp. 10-11).
The science of winning these violent storms is
demonstrated by the techniques employed by a commander and his
forces to threaten or destroy an enemy's critical tactical
vulnerability. Such techniques include types of movement and
attacks, formations, fire orders, etc. The art of winning
battles, as discussed in Chapter IV, is reflected in a
commander's unique combination of techniques to open a clear
and unobstructed path to the enemy's vulnerability.
Specifically developed for the time, place, and enemy
encountered in the swirling storm of battle, the combination
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of techniques is called tactics. A commander's tactics are
the expression of this creativity, originality, confidence,
and boldness within the storm of battle [Ref. 55:p. 37).
Critical vulnerabilities at the tactical level of war
are more clear-cut than those at the strategic level. They
are often physical targets: enemy centers of gravity, exposed
flanks; chokepoints along an enemy supply line, an air defense
belt [Ref. 37:p. 36). They are what Jomini and Clausewitz
referred to as decisive points, the destruction or seizure of
which leads to a decision in battle [Ref. 52:p. 51]. Just
because tactical vulnerabilities are easier to recognize,
however, does not mean they are any less easy to discern cr
attack. Tactical commanders ply their trade deep in the storm
of battle, where the level of disorder is highest. Location
of weaknesses is difficult, their discovery fleeting. Success
at the tactical level of war falls to those who can most
quickly locate and attack these fleeting glimpses of critical
vulnerabilities.
It is now easier to understand the "middle level" of
command in war. Operational commanders link the efforts of
the tactical commanders to the objectives of the theater
CINC's, and indirectly to the overall strategic goal.
Operational commanders decide both when and where to fight
battles, and when and where to refuse batt±.es, on a strategic
basis. Their decisions are guided by the desire to "conserve
ammunition," to achieve operational goals with the fewest
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battles [Ref. 56:p. 45]. The operational level of command
seeks to identify an enemy's critical operational
vulnerability, to create a center of gravity at or near this
key weakness, and to destroy or threaten the vulnerability so
that the enemy quits the fight [Ref. 52:p. 57]. As the name
of this level of war implies, the shaping of the local combat
climate to either precipitate or threaten storms of battle is
the realm of military operations:
In war conducted by military forces the act of battle
is a phase limited in time.. .The forces to be engaged
must first be brought within range of each other and
naturally each side will try to go into battle in
conditions most favorable to itself. The sum total of
the dispositions and maneuvers which go to make up
this process is known as "operations." [Ref. 57 :p. 59]
It is also easy to envision tactical operations -- the
creation of tactical centers of gravity to attack decisive
points found within a storm of battle. To prevent confusion,
operations conducted at the operational level of war are
called campaigns. Campaigns cover much broader geographical
areas and much longer time-spans than do tactical operations
[Ref. 58:p. 63]. Operational commanders are thus seen to
practice the art and science of winning campaigns.
When all theater campaigns are viewed as a whole, the
broad patterns that they reveal indicate the strategic CINC's
overall strategy to unmask and destroy the enemy's strategic
vulnerability. Just as this key vulnerability guides the
actions of theater CINC's, so too do the CINCs' specific
campaign plans guide the actions of the tactical commanders.
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The result is a link that fuses the varying interpretations
of vulnerabilities at the different levels of command,
providing a seamless connection between war'= highest policy
aims and the physical actions of the gunfighters.
Tactical actions that in and of themselves have direct
operational or strategic significance are called special
operations [Ref. 56:p. 45]. Special operation Commanders
usually lead small, highly-trained units on selective,
dangerous missions against strategic or operational targets
of opportunity. They typically deal in extremes: for some
missions they have weeks, even months to prepare; other
targets are fleeting, demanding immediate response. In either
case, special operations are the "wild cards" used by the
strategic warfighting and operational commanders to win high
stake gambles within the climate of combat.
Table 1 shows some of the organizational relationships
among the different levels of war. A cautionary note, however,
is in order. The table is not meant to equate specific units
with operations at a specific level of war. It is intended
only to help visualize the three levels of war using
representative field formations. As the definition of special
operations makes plain, a tactical unit may be used to gain
operational, or even strategic, results. Any mechanistic
tendency to associate units with a level of war should be
resisted [Ref. 58:p. 64].
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TABLE 1
THE LEVELS OF COMMAND/WAR
[from Ref. 5 8:p. 64]
LEVEL AREA ORGANIZATION FORMATIONS













Tactical Area of Operations Task Unit
MEU (USMC)
Task Element
4. Forms of Warfare
Regardless of the level of war, combat comes in two
basic forms: the offense and the defense. Offensive combat
is the combat of imposition: its goal is to impose a decision
on the enemy. The offense aims either to attack the enemy's
critical vulnerability directly, or to attack lesser
vulnerabilities until a path is discovered to the key enemy
weakness. The initiative lies with the offense since the
attacker precipitates the storm of battle: he picks the time,
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place, and method to exploit his enemy's vulnerabilities. The
offense is therefore the preferred form of combat to seek a
decision in war [Ref. 37:p. 24].
Defensive combat is the combat of resistance: its goal
is to resist an enemy's attempt to impose his will. The
defense aims first to protect a friendly critical
vulnerability from attack. Although the defense concedes the
initiative to the enemy because it can only predict the time,
place, and intensity of the coming storm, it is marked by
positions or methods that seek to: limit the enemy's ability
to select the place and type of attack; blunt the effects of
the storm's first blow; magnify the effects of friendly
weapons and advantages; and offer many blind paths that lead
away from friendly vulnerabilities. In essence, a defense
tries to turn the effects of the storm's disorder against the
enemy. In this way, while the initiative lies with the enemy,
so too does the likelihood that he will expose his own
weaknesses before he can uncover those of the defense. Like
the dealer who stands on 17, the defender offers the attacker
the chance to "bust" the attack. The defense is the
inherently stronger form of combat, and is especially
appropriate for a weaker opponent [Ref. 37:p. 25].
Despite their differences, there are similarities and
overlap between the theoretical extremes of these two forms
of combat. If a goal of the defense is to entice the attacker
to expose his weaknesses before he uncovers the defender's,
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this implies that the defense is prepared to strike at these
vulnerabilities. Indeed, an important, even decisive, elemernt
of the defense is found in the counterattack, making offensive
action an integral component of the defense. Likewise, if the
offense exposes a weakness before the defender's critical
vulnerability is found, the attacker is often compelled to
assume a temporary defense to protect it; this makes defensive
action an integral part of the offense. In the practical
application of armed force, there is often no clear-cut
dividing line between offensive and defensive action [Ref.
37:pp. 25-26].
Although the line between the offense and defense is
sometimes difficult to discern, it is marked by a concept
called the culminating point. No offensive can sustain itself
indefinitely. Over time, the inescapable effects of disorder
combine to rob the offensive storm of its strength and fury.
Moreover, the longer the attack lasts, the higher the
probability that friendly vulnerabilities will be exposed to
the defense. The culminating point is that point where it is
either physically impossible or imprudent to continue the
attack; the point where the attack is most vulnerable to an
cnemy counterthrust. It is at this point in time and space
where the offense temporarily assumes the defense [Ref. 37:p.
26].
Despite their practical similarities and the
difficulty in identifying the culminating point, conceptually
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the two forms of comnat are clearly divided by their initial
intent. The offense seeks first to force a decision; a
commander risks exposing his own weaknesses in order to allow
him to actively seek out and attack his enemy's critical
vulnerability at a time and place of his own choosing. In
other words, the offense seeks to ride the wind, shaping the
storm of battle in such a way that its full violence and fury
is -.1rected toward the defense. The defense seeks first to
prevent a decision and only second to lay tile groundwork to
impose one. It seeks to blunt the force of a battlestorm
before it can threaten a friendly vulnerability, and in the
process both to exhaust the attacker and to lay him open for
a decisive riposte.
5. Styles of Warfare
Good armies are those that can shape the climate of
combat and threaten or precipitate battlestorms on terms
favorable to themselves, and then direct the storms' fury to
impose decisions upon their enemies. The terms attrition and
maneuver warfare represent the the -retical extremes of the way
armies attempt to modify war's unpredictable and disorderly
environment to gain a decisive warfighting advantage3 These
two styles of warfare perceive and attack enemies' critical
vulnerabilities in fundamentally different ways. Again, a
3As such, maneuver and attrition cepresent alternative
environmental adaptation strategies for any warfighting
architecture.
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gambling analogy Ihalps to characterize their differences.
The attrition style of war seeks only to take an
enemy's pile of chips -- to "bust" the enemy commander. The
enemy's critical vulnerability is always seen as his army and
its material support. Attrition is simple to play. A
commander plays every hand to win, and seeks a cumulative
reduction in the enemy's ability to make a meaningful bet.
The betting style is also easy to master. Because the end
result of each hand is generally proportional to the size of
the opposing bets, an attritionist raises the ante whenever
and wherever possible. The larger the bets, the greater the
"pot," and the higher the possibility of seriously depleting
the enemy's playing reserves with a winning hand.
Accordingly, play is generally more centralized; there are
fewer players responsible for laying bets. Bluff and small
bets are used only to protect a bad band to minimize losses
on a particular draw, not to influence an enemy's confidence.
Because of the element of chance, losses are expected.
However, the attrition style of play seeks to minimize
chance's impact on the gamble's final outcome. This is done
by using large initial stakes, and relying on the strategic
and theater CINC's to make up losses incurred during play.
Indeed, this is the very essence of attrition warfare: an
inelegant and methodical grinding down of the enemy's stake
until he is literally incapable of further play.
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In contrast, "pure" maneuver warfare alms first to
make the enemy "fold," and only second to make him "bust."
Attrition occurs during play, but it is designed to influence
the enemy's playing strategy and weaken his confidence and
psychological strength, not to take his entire stake. A
critical vulnerability is any weakness that will eat away at
the opposing commander's will to continue the gamble. The
style emphasizes the importance of identifying this
vulnerability, and plays only those hands that seem most
likely to unmask or attack it. Maneuver i - characterized by
deccntrali7ed play, it seeks to pit an enemy player against
several friendly players who coordinate their playing
strategy. The friendly player with the most promising cards
is always the one left betting at the deciding point in the
hand -- he is the gamble's "main effort."4  The betting of
supporting players and the timing of their withdrawal from the
hai seek to confuse an rattle the opposing player --
especially to get him to overcommit to a weak hand. Bluffs
are an integral part of the playing strategy, aimed at getting
the enemy to forteit his bet without playing out the hand.
Chance and disorder ensure that the best friendly hand will
4Focus of efforc(s) and main effort are key terms in maneuver
warfare. The critical vulnerability is the focus of effort of
multiple attacks. The most successful of the multiple at'acks
becomes the main effort. Note that this implies the main effort
can shift as circumstances dictate. Maneuv-r commanders always
support the main effort with the majority of resources [Ref. 59:p.
32].
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not always survive the storm of battle. However, maneuver
warfare seeks to enlist the aid of chance rather than to limit
its effects. Sooner or later, chances are that one of the
friendly players will get a hand strong enough to seciously
test the enemy. Maneuver attempts to quickly identify this
hand, and through coordinated play strengthen it as much as
possible to increase the chance of its winning -- to make it
the gamble's main effort. Until a strong hand develops, a
maneuver commander is content to repeatedly fold, denying the
enemy any opportunity to exploit a strong hand. In other
words, the essence of the maneuver style is to continually pit
strength against weakness, thereby frustrating an opponent's
playing strategy.
Although these two styles of warfare are easily
distinguishable in theory, like offense and defensive combat,
they are less clearly defined in practice. Styles of warfare
are really a combination of command style and tactical style
(Ref. 48]. Command style refers to the emphasis in
warfighting approach -- either attrition or maneuver -- at the
operational and strategic levels of war. Tactical style
includes the tactical level of command as well as the
techniques employed by forces in physical contact with the
enemy. Attempts to shape the combat environment often involve
combining maneuver at the operational level and attrition at
the tactical level of war or vice versa; the two seemingly
opposing styles can coexist. Table 2 is a simple matrix to
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help visualize the interplay of attrition and maneuver
strategies between the different levels of war.
TABLE 2
THE STYLE OF WARFARE MATRIX
TACTICAL STYLE
ATTRITION MANEUVER
,Union; Civil Battle of the
ATTRITION War Saints
Allies; WWI Soviet Navy
Pre-modern Submarine




MANEUVER Patton's Third Germans, WWII
Army
Soviet Army Israelis, 1967
There are many examples of an attrition-attrition
style of war. This style is along the lines of warfare
practices by the Union during the Civil War, by the Allies
along the Western Front in World War I, or (for the most part)
by opposing navies up until the invention of the airplane and
submarine. The command style is focused on logistics --
mustering superior resources (bets) at the proper time and
place. The tactical style treats the enemy as an inventory
of targets, to be destroyed by sheer firepower and weight of
metal [Ref. 60:p. 86]. Movement is used primarily to increase
the effects of friendly weapons on the enemy. The overall
style is to pit strength against strength. While brutally
effective, attrition storms are among the most violent in war,
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and take an enormous toll in both men and material.
Willingness to embrace this style implies a net superiority
in available resources over the course of a war.
The maneuver-maneuver style is best characterized by
Genghis Khan and the Mongols, the Israelis during the 1967
War and the latter part of the 1973 War, and the Germans
during World War II (at least at the operational level and
below). The command style focuses on "relational" action --
action guided by a close study of the enemy and his way of
doing things. The purpose is to muster overwhelming strength
against an enemy's operational vulnerability, even though the
enemy may have superior overall strength [Ref. 60:p. 86]. The
tactical style is decentralized; many small units, guided in
their actions by the tactical commander's overall plan, use
relational movement to find or create enemy vulnerabilities.
The tactical commander then tries to exploit these weaknesses
to shape and win the battle. The German term for this unique
tactical style is aufstragtaktik [Ref. 61:p. 29]. As this
style focuses less on destroying the enemy's forces and more
on crushing the enemy's will to resist, it is especially
attractive to an army facing an opponent who has superior
strategic strength and reserves.
The combination of a maneuver command style and an
attrition tactical style is the style of warfare perfected by
the Emperor Napoleon, and later used with great success by
Patton and his Third Army and the Soviet Army in World War
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II. This command style is characterized by violent
penetration battles, using attrition tactics, followed by
large-scale encirclements. It is especially suited for mass
conscripted armies that do not possess the training to
practice aufstragtaktik, but who seek the operational
flexibility of maneuver. This is the style Americans would
face today in a fight against a Soviet-trained or led
opponent. Maneuver-attrition style may also be dictated by
other factors, such as the nature of the theater of
operations. The Pacific Theater in World War II led to an
amphibious campaign that combined strategic/operational
maneuver with attrition battles [Ref. 37:p. 28].
The attrition-maneuver style of warfare is uniquely
naval in character. Naval warfare is a force-on-force process
that tends toward the simultaneous attrition of both sides at
all levels of war [Ref. 62:p. 146]. With the advent of
airplane and the submarine, however, naval maneuver at the
tactical level became commonplace. Submarine campaigns are
examples of this style of warfare, and the Soviet Navy
practices this warfighting style today. But attrition-
maneuver warfare was not "invented" along with the airplane
and the submarine. George Bridges Rodney and bis British
fleet defeated Comte de Grasse and his French fleet at the
1782 Battle of the Saints using this style, and Admiral Nelson
later perfected it to high levels [Ref. 63:p. 56-61].
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Inventive naval commanders have often resorted to tactical
maneuver to achieve naval operational attrition.
Styles of warfare are thus less clear-cut than a
simple comparison between "pure" attrition and "pure" maneuver
would suggest. As war is characterized by an infinitely
variable environment, any strategy that seeks to shape its
climate must also be infinitely variable. Attrition and
maneuver merely mark the ends of a continuum of options
available to help create a wartime or combat advantage, and
to exploit an enemy's perceived critical vulnerability. While
an army can emphasize one approach over the other, it must be
prepared to use both styles in combination to flourish in war.
D. DESTROYING A CRITICAL VULNERABILITY: APPLYING COMBAT POWER
1. Combat Power Defined
Physical damage in battle results from the strike of
a "bullet," aimed and fired from a commander's weapon. The
bullet represents some portion of the commander's available
combat strength, delivered in some way to impel force on the
enemy. Obviously, to hurt an enemy, he must first be hit.
This is not an easy task, even after a vulnerability has been
identified. Chance and disorder make "aiming in" a difficult
proposition. And friction and chance ensure that bullets
seldom hit the commander's point of aim. But when a bullet
does strike home, the damage it inflicts is measured by its
combat power -- the total destructive force brought to bear
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on an enemy target at given time and place [Ref. 37:p. 30].
Combat "power" is a uniquely appropriate term borrowed
from physics. At the risk of trying to over-rationalize war,
it is helpful to fully understand the scientific meaning of
power. Whenever a body exerts a force (measured by the
product of its mass and acceleration) on an object and causes
its displacement, work is done on that object. Work is
defined as the product of the body's (bullet's) force, the
distance the object (enemy) is moved, and the angle of impact
between the bullet's path and the enemy's displacement. Power
is nothing more than work divided by a time interval. In
other words, if the bullet causes no enemy displacement, no
work is done, and no appreciable combat power is applied
against the enemy.
By measuring the total destructive force on a target
in terms of power, damage to the enemy is linked back to the
two complementary goals of every gunfight: to conserve
ammunition and to end the fight as quickly as possible. If
a friendly bullet is fired at a target with no measurable
power, then the bullet either missed or it did not have enough
force to hurt the enemy or overcome his defenses.
Alternatively, the bullet did some local damage but not enough
to move the enemy. In this case, the point of impact was
neither a decisive point nor a critical vulnerability; the
lack of damage was caused by poor target selection. In either
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case, the bullet was wasted, and the commander's available
combat strength is dissipated toward no useful combat purpose.
Setting aside the problem of target selection, which
was covered in the previous section, and the effects of
chance, which are unpredictable, one is left with the
following question: what can be done to increase the damage
caused by a commander's bullet? Restated, how can a commander
deliver maximum combat power against the enemy?
2. The Essential Components: Concentration and Speed
The greater a bullet's mass, the greater its force,
and the greater the potential work done on the enemy.
Therefore, a logical step toward maximizing combat power is
to increase the size of the bullet -- the amount of friendly
force -- which strikes the enemy at a specific time and place.
But combat power also depends on the distance the enemy is
displaced by the strike of the bullet, which is often directly
related to thp relative masses of friendly and enemy force at
the bullet's point of impact. The larger the ratio of
friendly to enemy force there, the greater the enemy's
potential displacement. Concentration, not mass, is therefore
the first true step toward generating effective combat power.
Concentration is a central tenet of warfare. The
ability to create local superiority at the bullet's point of
impact is the "aim" of all commanders: "In war, numbers alone
confer no advantage...It is sufficient to estimate the enemy
situation correctly and to concentrate your strength to
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capture him" [Ref. 41:p. 122]. Concentration of force applies
to all available resources, and implies a willingness to
economize elsewhere to achieve it. This often means leaving
paths to friendly vulnerabilities less protected than desired,
and accepting the associated risk that they will be discovered
and attacked [Ref. 37:p. 31].
Recall that battlestorms have grown in scope as the
result of unit dispersion made necessary by the range and
lethality of modern weapons. Therefore, to concentrate
friendly units entails risks of its own, and these risks must
be moderated by concentrating in time as well as space.
Knowing when to concentrate is an important trait of a good
commander. As Sun Tzu said, "The strike of a hawk...breaks
the back of its prey for the reason it waits for the right
moment to strike. Its movement is regulated" [Ref. 41:p. 92].
Like the gunfighter who is always on the move, stopping to
fire only when the enemy presents a vulnerable target, a
commander disperses, concentrates, and redisperses his forces
to regulate the timing and placement of his "shots" --
potential combat power.
The science and art of regulating the application of
combat power depend on unique types of combat speed. The
science of regulating potential combat power is based on
velocity. Combat velocity -- the distance that a unit can
cover over a given amount of time -- is a measure of a unit's
ability to move fast [Ref. 37:p. 32]. Both to quickly
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concentrate widely dispersed forces at the decisive place and
time, and to redisperse them after an attack, individual units
must possess high combat velocities.
The second type of combat speed is tempo. Tempo is
speed over time -- the ability of a force to "operate" quickly
[Ref. 37:p. 32]. Tempo reflects the art of regulating
potential combat power, in that it includes both the
commander's ability to choose the precise placement and timing
of an attack, and the ability of his forces to hit the point
of decision at the right time. In other words, tempo is a
direct measure of an army's decision-action cycle.
The combination of high combat velocities and high
tempo helps a commander shape the combat climate in his favor.
High combat speeds are the second key component necessary for
generating high potential combat power. Remember that combat
power is directly related to the amount of armed force that
can be exerted against an enemy over a given length of time.
The higher the combat speeds, the shorter the time interval
during which force can be applied against an enemy, and the
greater the potential combat power. Of course, if the enemy
possesses equal or greater combat speeds, he can more quickly
mass at a point of decision and effectively blunt the amount
of combat power that can be applied against him. Therefore,
like relative mass (concentration), the second key contributor
to potential combat power is higher relative combat speeds.
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The combination of concentration and high relative
combat speeds is momentum, another physics term uniquely
suited to warfighting. In the absence of opposing force, the
momentum of a friendly unit will remain relatively constant.
"Other forces" in combat are general friction and any opposing
force brought to bear by the enemy. If the effects of
friction are minimized and the enemy cannot or is prevented
from bringing opposing force to bear, momentum propels a
commander's forces deep into the enemy's defenses. The
".hock" and "penetrating" effect of momentum greatly enhances
an attack's final combat power [Ref. 37:p. 32].
3. Enhancing Combat Power: Surprise and Deception
One way to prevent an enemy from effectively
countering friendly momentum is to surprise him. Achieving
surprise is a key goal in war. It entails hitting an enemy
at a time, place, or manner for which he is unprepared,
causing disorientation in the mind of the enemy commander as
he perceives a major, rapid, and dangerous change to the
combat environment. The typical result is a psychological
paralysis that prevents a timely, organized, or coherent enemy
reaction to the change. The paralysis may only be temporary,
or may result in the total collapse of an opponent's ability
to resist. In any event, the victim of surprise is at a
distinct disadvantage in offering an effective counter to the
application of combat force against him.
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In modern military jargon, surprise is a "force
multiplier," psychologically magnifying the amount of combat
power delivered against an enemy. Baron Whaley, in a 1976
(unpublished) manuscript entitled Stratagem: Deception and
Surprise in Warfare, tried to quantify the impact that
surprise exerts in war [Ref. 64]. Tables 3 and 4 summarize
his examination of the effects of surprise in 168 battles
fought in 16 wars between 1914 and 1968. Several key points
stand out.
TABLE 3
FORCE USED TO GAIN OBJECTIVES AFTER WORLD WAR I
[from Ref. 64:p. 193]
SURPRISE NO SURPRISE
ACHIEVEMENT NO. FORCE RATIO NO. FORCE RATIO
Victory 18 1.2:1 1 2.5:1
About as planned 28 1.1:1 4 1.4:1
Below expectations 17 1.4:1 9 1.4:1
Defeat 4 1.0:1 20 .9:1
TOTAL CASES 67 34
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TABLE 4
EFFECT OF SURPRISE ON CASUALTIES IN 90% OF CASES 1914-1967
[from Ref. 64:p. 193]
NO. CASES AVG. CASUALTY RATIO
Surprise 79 1:5.3
No surprise 45 1:1.1
TOTAL 122
First, when surprise is achieved, 69 per cent of
military actions result in outright victory or substantial
success. The success rate falls to 15 per cent when and where
surprise is not achieved. Second, surprise seems to quintuple
the relative casualty ratio between the victim and benefactor
of surprise. Third, to achieve victory without surprise,
concentration is an essential requirement; a 2.5:1 superiority
of forces is needed at the point of decision. The comparable
ratio to achieve victory with surprise is less than half that.
It seems clear that surprise is indeed a multiplier of combat
power, allowing a commander to use his men more sparingly and
with better results.
There are four general ways to achieve surprise in
war. The first is through sheer chance. In the disorderly
storm of battle, random collisions are commonplace. Depending
on the vigilance of the colliding forces, either one or both
sides may be surprised. In the first case, the advantage of
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surprise falls to the commander and force better able to shake
off the resulting shock and dictate subsequent actions. In
the second, the ability of the unaffected combatant to exploit
the enemy's disorientation before he can recover will
determine the final impact that surprise plays in the
encounter. Note that in both cases, higher relative tempo is
the critical factor which determines which force will overcome
or exploit the effects of random surprise.
Because of the uncertainties of chance, most
commanders actively try to create the conditions favorable for
surprise. One way to do this is caroagh security -- the
passive attempt to conceal friendly intentions or preparations
from the enemy. Unfortunately, even the tightest security
measures help achieve surprise only against the most
preoccupied or incompetent enemy. Whaley determined that out
of 116 selected exampies of strategic and tactical surprise,
only 11 could be "exclusively or even mainly attributed to
security." The lesson is that specific warning signals almost
always pass through a security screen to be received by the
intended victim [Ref. 64:pp. 1-2]. For a commander intent on
achieving surprise, relying on security seems little better
then pure chance.
A more likely means of achieving surprise is to
constantly operate at higher combat tempos -- to use speed as
a weapon of surprise. While higher combat speeds allow a
commander to exploit the random surprises that inevitably
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occur in the climate of combat, higher speeds can also be used
to create the conditions for surprise. As Sun Tzu said, "What
is the greatest importance in war is extraordinary
speed;.. .when the thunderclap comes, there is no time (for
the enemy) to cover his ears" [Ref. 41:p. 70]. Higher
relative combat speeds creates ambiguity and confusion in the
mind of the enemy commander, as he is unable to keep up with
unfolding e',ents. When the next "thunderclap" arrives, the
result may be an overload in the enemy's ability to respond
or adapt, and surprise is complete. Frequent envelopments and
high prisone:r count are symptoms of this type of surprise
[Ref. 64:pp. 99-100].
The fourth way to achieve surpris-e in war is through
deception, the deliberate attack on the mind of an enemy
commander to mislead him or to cause him to do something
counter to his interests [Ref. 65:p. 1-1]. However, the
effects of deception are so different and powerful that it
should be viewed as a separate and distinct multiplier of
combat power. Consider the data in Table 5, again drawn from
Whaley's work on surprise and deception. The average casualty
ratio for surprise through deception is over three times that
of surprise without deception, suggesting that a fundamentally
different psychological effect is at work. Whaley deduced
that while surprise is often the direct result of a war's
uncertainties, deception makes a commander quite certain, very




[from Ref. 64:p. 195]
No. Cases Avg. Casualty Ratio
Surprise with Deception 57 1:6.3
Surprise without Deception 20 1:2.0
No surpirse with Deception 5 1:1.3
No Surprise without Deception 40 1:1.1
TOTAL 122
A successful deception either deepens or prolongs the
enemy's psychological paralysis after being surprised, or
prevents him from taking effective counteractions to respond
to surprise. In the first case, the onset of disorientation
caused by deception occurs much later than that caused by
"normal" surprise. This delay is due to the fact that changes
in the environment precipitated by friendly forces do not
initially shake the enemy commander's perception of friendly
intentions. Friendly moves are themselves seen as a feint!
By the time the enemy's perceptions do change, the environment
is so radically altered that his resulting disorientation is
over three times as severe as a case involving surprise. In
the second case, deception seeks to both facilitate friendly
concentration and to seriously delay enemy attempts to apply
effective counterforce at the point of attack:
If I am able to determine the enemy's dispositions
while at the same time I conceal my own, I can
concentrate and he must divide. And if I concentrate
while he divides, I can use my entire strength against
a fraction of his.. .and those I deal with will be in
dire straights. [Ref. 41:p. 98]
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Surprise through deception is thus seen to be related
to, but separate from, other types of surprise. Surprise
caused by chance, security, or higher relative tempos all
result in immediate disorientation as the victim perceives a
rapid and dangerous change in the environment. Deception, on
the other hand, results in a much delayed disorientation, as
the most important and dangerous change in the environment is
either missed or misunderstood. Disorientation, when it does
come, is thus far more severe. When successful, deception is
the most powerful tool available to multiply the effects of
combat power.
E. ENDGAME
As discussed in Chapter IV, the aim of war is to impose
one's will on a hostile and resisting opponent. Recall that
there are two ways to achieve this aim. The first is to
physically take the opponent's stake -- to destroy his
fighting forces or the means critical to their support. The
second is to psychologically take the opponent's stake -- by
destroying his will to resist. In either case, war is
ultimately decided by the relative abilities of the opposing
commanders to identify and target their enemy's critical
vulnerabilities, and the relative abilities of their forces
to apply superior combat power against them. Chance and luck
do, of course, play a big part in both of these abilities.
But war's final decision is based on the results of, and not
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the intent of, these two key factors.
Decision by a "Caesar," action by his "legions." This in
a nutshell is the process that drives the engine of war.
Regardless of war's policy motives, the level of command
involved, the style of warfare a commander prefers, or the
form of combat a commander pursues, war is the cumulative
result of countless decisions and actions made to quickly
locate and destroy an enemy's critical vulnerabilities through
the superior application of combat power. To do this
consistently better than one's opponent demands that the
effectiveness of one's decision-action cycle be superior to
the enemy's.
Chapter IV proposed a view of war that turns heavily on
the attributes of the commander. This chapter expands that
view in the practical realm of warfighting to include the
commander's weapon -- his armies. The next step is to develop
a model for the fundamental combat action process -- the
decision-action cycle. Once this combat action model is
developed, the framework for a relevant National Space
Warfighting Architecture will be complete.
118
VI. THE COMBAT ACTION PROCESS: A MODEL
A. INTRODUCTION
The last thing that must be discussed before the framework
for a National Space Warfighting Architecture can be built is
the combat action process itself. While the previous chapter
attempts to delineate the fundamental importance that this
process plays in war's outcome, it is important that its
components be fully defined and understood to gain an
appreciation of the NSWA's individual and :;ganizational
decision-making structure. The purpose of this chapter is
therefore to develop a conceptual model that describes the
inner workings of the combat action process. Once again, the
intent is to present a model that is applicable to all
services, in all types of conflict, at all levels of command,
regardless of preferred style of war or form of combat.
B. DEFINING FORCE COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS
What makes an effective fighting force? The pat answer
is commanders who make consistently good decisions and issue
clear and appropriate orders, and whose fighting men then
reliably and proficiently carry them out. But what are "good"
decisions and orders? What is "proficient" performance?
Before force combat effectiveness can be discussed, one must
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first define measures of combat performance and combat
effectiveness.
Combat performance can generally be measured by an army's
ability to apply armed force against its enemy. The higher
the level of force applied, the higher the level of combat
performance. Remember, however, that armed force may be
expended toward no useful purpose in war unless that force is
converted into combat power. In other words, any army's
actions must be relevant as well as proficient; the army must
direct armed force against its enemy's critical
vulnerabilities. Relevancy of an army's overall actions is
judged primarily by the political aims of the war itself,
while at the individual levels of war it is gauged by a
commander's ability to discern his opponent's key weakness.
Combat effectiveness is therefore a combination of an army's
performance and the relevance of its actions; it is marked by
a proficient army, applying appropriate levels of combat
power, agai,.t critical vulnerabilities, in pursuit of
identifiable and appropriate political aims.
Armed with these conceptual measures of combat performance
and effectiveness, it is now possible to consider a definition
for force combat effectiveness. Note that an army's actions
can be both relevant and proficient -- its commanders can make
good decisions and orders and its fighting men can
proficiently carry them out -- and its overall force
effectiveness can still be low. If an enemy is consistently
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better able to locate and destroy friendly critical
vulnerabilities, then the best laid and most relevant plans,
coupled with an army's best performance, will more often than
not come up short over the course of a war. Force combat
efiectivenes6 is therefoie a measure of relative wartime
performance and effectiveness.
In broad terms, an effective fighting force is one that
is better able to shape the climate of combat and precipitate
battlestorms on terms favorable to itself, and then operate
within the storms' disorderly confines to achieve consistently
favorable combat results. This view of force effectiveness
implies a consistent relative superiority in finding and
destroying critical vulnerabilities at all levels of command.
It also helps one understand the remarkable successes that
certain leaders and armies have enjoyed against enemies who
are every bit as well equipped and motivated. For example:
- Alexander's ability to sense weakness and fear at a
certain point in his opponent's lines, and his army's
ability to hit the point with a rapid, well-aimed and
regulated thrust.
- Napoleon's ability to see the seams between his
opponent's formations, and his army's ability to
quickly hit these seams to divide and shatter the
enemy's cohesiveness.
- The Israelis' ability to discern their opponents'
critical operational vulnerabilities, and their army's
ability to exploit these vulnerabilities to create a
decisive advantage in war [Ref. 66:p. vii].
In each case, the key to combat success is found in
superior force combat effectiveness, which is in turn measured
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by: a commander's ability to sense his enemy's key weakness
and to devise a workable plan to attack or exploit it; and his
force's ability to carry out the plan and to apply combat
power against the weakness. "Decision-action" is therefore,
an incomplete description of the combat action process. A
more accurate one is "sense-decision-action." An effective
fighting force is one with relatively superior sense-decision-
action processes at all levels of command across the entire
spectrum of conflict.
C. CHOOSING A FOCUS: DEBATING THE CHOICES
1. Command and Control or Command and Action?
Recognizing the importance that the sense-decision-
action process plays in determining war's final outcome, one
is faced with an immediate dilemma when developing a model to
describe and understand it: what should be the model's focus?
There seems to be two basic approaches. The first, the
command and control approach, focuses primarily on the
commander's role in war. The second, the command and action
approach, focuses on the role of the fighting force as a
whole. The choice is critical, as it will in large part
determine the effectiveness of any model that hopes to
describe the complete combat action process.
2. Command and Control
Consider carefully Martin Van Crevald's description of
the command process in his book Command in War:
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There is, in the first place, the gathering of
information on the state of one's own forces...as well
as the enemy and on such external factors as the
weather and the terrain...Means must be found to
store, retrieve, filter, classify, distribute and
display it. On the basis of the information thus
processed an estimate of the situation must be found.
Objectives must be laid down and alternative methods
for attaining them worked out. A decision must be
made. Detailed planning must be gotten under way.
Orders must be drafted and transmitted...Execution
must be monitored by means of a feedback system, at
which point the process repeats itself. [Ref. 45:p.
7]
In other words, Van Crevald sees the command process
consisting of some nine steps: gathering information;
collating information; preparing an estimate of the situation;
selecting objectives; developing alternatives, making a
decision; preparing a plan; transmitting orders; and
monitoring force execution. The subtle implication is that
the command process is separate from the actions of a
commander's forces; the two are linked, but conceptually
divided processes. A repetitive command process allows a
commander to adjust and control the (separate) action
process(es) of his forces. Thus, the term command and
control, which according the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), is
the "exercise of authority and direction by a properly
designated commander" by "planning, directing, coordinating,
and controlling forces and operations" [Ref. 67:p. 77]. In
other words, both parts of command and control are focused on
the combat leader: command decides what he wants to do in
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combat, and control shapes and prods the actions of his forces
to turn that want into reality [Ref. 68:p. 7].
Perhaps the first U.S. model to fully describe the
command and control process was the one developed jointly in
1977 by Dr. Joel S. Lawson and Professor Paul Moose (see
Figure 4). The Lawson model, as it is now called, uses five
action verbs to describe its key steps [Ref. 62:p. 185-186].
These five steps generally mirror those outlined above by Van
Crevald, with two small differences. First, several of Van
Crevald's steps are combined into single steps in the Lawson
model (see Figure 5). And second, whereas single iteration
of Van Crevald's command and control process ends with task
"monitor" before it begins to repeat itself, monitoring
friendly actions is part of the first step of a subsequent
iteration in the Lawson model.
Despite these minor differences, however, there is one
key similarity between the two models: since their focus is
clearly on the commander's personal wartime role, they
describe only the first two steps of the sense-decision-action
process. As a result, there is no clear feeling of the
fundamental bond that links a commander and his forces as an
indivisible fighting entity. Moreover, the processes are one-







































Figure 5. Comparing the Van Creveld and Lawson C2 Models
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Different, more recent command and control models
continue this pattern (see Figure 6). The four models shown
differ only in the way that their basic processes are
partitioned, as indicated by the changes in the words that
describe their respective steps [Ref. 70:p. 6]. Notice that
the models that use verbs to describe their steps usually have
more than those which use nouns or phrases, since nouns
describe subprocesses that incorporate several smaller steps.
Regardless of their length, however, all the models have
similar endings: two of the processes end with the verb
"direct," one with the noun "decision," and one with the
phrase "response selection." All continue to focus on the
friendly commander and the effect that he has on his own
forces and the combat environment.
There are some signs of change. Dr. Lawson now
believes that his model should accommodate the enemy control
cycle, resu ng in the conceptual model shown in Figure 7
[Ref. 62:pp. 186-187]. While showing the competitive
interplay between friendly and enemy C' processes is a step in
the right direction, it cannot overcome a fundamental weakness
of the command and control approach. By dividing the sense-
decision-action process into two parts, and then focusing on
only one of them, command and control models hinder a more
complete view of combat. The problem, of course, is that










Figure 7. The Updated Lawson C2 Model
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more general sense, but to help quantify and evaluate C2
"system" performance at specific levels of command. They
therefore quite rightly focus on the commander's personal role
in war and the technological aids to help him reach a decision
and to subsequently control his focus. The models
successfully convey the primary importance of the commander
in war. They simply do not go far enough. The -nly way to
capture a full understanding of war is to consider sense-
decision-action as a conceptually indivisible combat process.
This is the thrust of the command and action approach.
As its title implies, this approach also stresses the
importance of the wartime role of the commander. However, it
considers him to be only a part, albeit a key part, of a
single, inseparable fighting entity. The tenuous link of
"monitoring force execution" is -lot strong enough to describe
the complex interactions that characterize the commander/unit
wartime team. Both the commander and his forces are buffeted
by the winds of disorder and the currents of chance, and both
must adapt and act tcgether to survive their fury and emerge
victoriously from battle.
In the opinion of this author, the command and action
approach is the correct one fir a combat model that hopes to
capture the ideas and concept. presented in this thesis. Two
questions, therefore, come to mind. Have any ccrmmand and
action models been proposed? And "f so, are they suitable for
use within the framework of a NSWA?
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2. An Interim Step: the "S-E-D-A', Cycle
The first apparent step to develop a command and
action model was made in 1971 by Brigadier General F.P.
Henderson, USMC (Ret). General Henderson proposed a sense-
evaluate-decide-act (or S-E-D-A) cycle to describe
"operational" processes in combat (not to be confused with the
operational level of command). Notice that the cycle adds
only one additional step -- evaluate -- to the previously
developed sense-decision-action process. Note also that in
contrast to most command and control models, the cycle ends
with the word "act" instead of direct, response selection, or
monitor. These two facts alone warrant a closer examination
of the General's creation.
General Henderson feels the S-E-D-A cycle is the
"essential antecedent of every tactical action, from the
individual rifleman to the highest command echelon" [Ref.
71:p. 21]. The process is called "the most critical,
frequent, and non-uniform sequence action in the (combat
unit)." In fact, in the General's view, "the degree of
excellence of this process has been the greatest single factor
in success or failure in battle." Excellence is measured by
the "speed and quality" of the process [Ref. 71:p. 37].
General Henderson is clearly aiming for more than the
command and control approach with the S-E-D-A cycle, since the
cycle applies to all fighting men, not just leaders. He
plainly recognizes the competitive impact that the enemy's
130
process plays in battle, since in his view battlefield success
falls to the side with the "superior" S-E-D-A cycle -- the one
with the higher relative speed and quality. Moreover, he
hints at the unified nature of the warfighting unit by
pointing out that a sure path toward higher process speeds is
to decentralize -- to distribute "operational"
responsibilities vertically within a fighting force. In this
way, no echelon of command is "overloaded" in combat [Ref.
71.p. 37]. This concept is developed further by his pointing
out that the cycle is non-uniform, meaning that the length and
character of the cycle are different at different levels of
command. Finally, since the process is the "antecedent of
every tactical action," General Henderson feels it to be
applicable to both forms of combat (the offense and the
defense) and in all tactical situations. Developed by a
warfighter for the warfighter, the S-E-D-A cycle aims to
describe the general nature of combat.
But a careful reading of the General's writings
reveals that the S-E-D-A cycle is a closer relation to the
command and control approach than it is to the command and
action approach. Although the S-E-D-A cycle purportedly
describes things to be done in combat by all Marines, in
"every occupational specialty" [Ref. 72:p. 24], its emphasis
remains squarely on the commander: "The sense-evaluate-decide-
act process centers about the units commander at every
tactical echelon. Ideally the process system should be fully
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responsive in real time to his needs and desires." And the
"act" in the commander's cycle refers not to the actions of
his forces, but to his issuing of orders to those f orces, and
to his requests to higher and supporting units [Ref. 71:p.
37]. Like the command and control process, the S-E-D-A cycle
is more an individual vice collective endeavor, with only an
implied link between the actions of the commander and the
actions of his forces.
The S-E-D-A cycle is therefore only a good first step
toward a more complete combat action model. It is especially
useful for identifying the additional steps necessary to reach
that final model. Like the S-E-D-A cycle, the final model
must emphasize the commander's importance in war. It must
similarly include the idea of relative superiority -- force
combat effectiveness -- by acknowledging the competitive
nature of the friendly and enemy sense-decision-action
processes. And it must continue to integrate the following
key ideas: that the way to superior force combat effectiveness
is through higher relative process speeds; that the process,
although universally relevant, is non-uniform in length and
character depending on the level of command and the tactical
situation; and that the process is applicable to both
offensive and defensive combat. However, the final model must
include two more ideas before it completely describes the
sense-decision-action process. First, it must describe the
entire combat action process, showing the inseparable
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relationship between the commander and his forces in war.
And second, it must be compatible with both maneuver and
attrition warfare. Th.3e seven ideas form the measures of
effectiveness (MOE's) by which a combat action model must be
judged.
3. Command and Action: the O-O-D-A Loop
In 1980, a retired Air Force Colonel, John R. Boyd,
finished an extraordinary study entitled "Patterns of
Conflict." The study had four goals: to make manifest the
nature of moral-mental-physical conflict; to discern a pattern
for successful operations; to help generalize tactics and
strategy; and to find a basis for "grand strategy" [Ref. 73 :p.
3]. surprisingly, the point of departure for these ambitious
goals was the air-to-air battles that occurred between
American F-86 fighters and Chinese MiG-15 fighters in the
skies over Korea. Although the Mig-15 had superior absolute
performance characteristics (speed, rate of climb, etc.), the
overall air-to-air kill ratio was over ten-to-one in favor of
the F-86. "Patterns of Conflict" resulted in part from
Colonel Boyd's curiosity about the reasons for the F-86's
formidable combat prowess [Ref. 73:p. 5].
Colonel Boyd attributed the F-86's success to three key
factors. First, the F-86's bubble canopy afforded an American
pilot a clear and unobstructed view of the sky, while the MiG-
15 cockpit severely restricted his opponent's view. Second,
the superior experience and tactics of the American pilots
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(many were World War II air combat veterans) seemed to allow
them to more quickly "size up" a tactical situation and to
decide what and how they wanted to do in a dogfight. Third,
the F-86 was more responsive; the time between a pilot's
decision to maneuver and the plane's response was much faster
than the comparable time for the MiG-15 [Ref. 74].
The net result: American pilots were consistently able
to more quickly observe the combat environment, adapt to each
unique tactical situation, make a decision about how to
maneuver against their enemy, and then translate that decision
into a position of relative advantage. Or if Clausewitz had
described it, American "commanders" could better penetrate the
fog of war; had less uncertainty; had both personal courage
and the courage to accept responsibility; had the creativity
and means to exploit fleeting, unanticipated opportunities;
and their forces faced less friction. They were then able to
use these cumulative advantages to shape the climate of combat
in their favor and more consistently and effectively attack
enemy critical vulnerabilities. Note however, that it was the
pilot/plane combat system, the combined strength of the
commander and his "unit," that was decisive. One without the
other could not explain the decisive success enjoyed by
American air forces over Korea [Ref. 74].
Colonel Boyd logically postulated that any commander
and fighting unit endowed with the conceptual advantages of
the pilot/F-86 combat team would be as consistently successful
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in the gamble of war. To assist in the in-depth research that
followed, Boyd developed a model that captured these
conceptual advantages and which could be used to critically
study war from any level of command and in any combat
situation.
So was born the Observation-Orientation-Decision-
Action, or "O-O-D-A," loop. The O-O-D-A loop is a true
command and action process; it describes the complete sense-
decision-action cycle. In the process, it incorporates the
strengths of both the command and control and S-E-D-A cycles.
Its conceptual birth from one-on-one aerial combat makes clear
that the process has meaning only in relation to an enemy's
command and action cycle. The model effectively depicts the
importance of the commander's wartime role. A key idea
imbedded within the process is that the outcome of battle is
often decided by higher relative process speeds. It is
applicable to all levels of war, but is constructed in such
a way that the process is seen to be nonuniform between the
different levels of command. The process is also equally
effective describing actions that take place in "blitz"
(offensive) and "counterblitz" (defensive) operations [Ref.
73:pp. 64 and 124]. Based on the MOE's outlined in the
previous section, if the O-O-D-A loop is relevant to both
types of warfare, it would appear to be ideally suited as the
basis for a universal combat action model.
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Because Boyd's final conclusions from "Patterns of
Conflict" are often used to support the concepts of maneuver
warfare, the O-O-D-A model is often thought to describe a
unique maneuver command and action process. For example, the
idea of higher relative process speeds, an important concept
in maneuver warfare, is totally absent from discussions about
attrition warfare in FMFM-1, Warfihting [Ref. 37:pp. 28-29].
In fact, FMFM-1 implies that attrition warfare has no need for
a selective command and action process, as in attrition
warfare, "any target is as good as any other as long as it
contributes to the cumulative destruction of the enemy" [Ref.
37:p. 85].
These views are wrong. The ideas imbedded in the
O-O-D-A model have strong ties to attrition warfare. First,
and most obviously, they spring from the study of air-to-air
attrition battles that occurred in the skies over Korea.
Second, recall that naval combat is a "force-on-force process,
involving in the threat or realization, the simultaneous
attrition of both sides" [Ref. 68:p. 5]. It is one of the
ultimate expressions of attrition warfare. Yet consider the
following description of naval combat:
As the two opposing commanders make their allocations
and deploy for battle, they are simultaneously making
position and timing decisions. A naval battle starts
well before the first weapons are fired. Both are
taking a series of steps building toward a climatic
decision, in which the winner will be the force which
attacks effectively first (emphasis added).
[Ref. 68:p. 7]
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It is clear from this passage that high process speeds are
just as important to the outcome of an attrition battle as
they are in maneuver. Third, although an attritionist's
selection of critical vulnerabilities is more rigid than a
maneuverist's, once inside the storm of battle, a selective
attrition command and action process is often just as
important for victory. If one's survival is a concern, any
target is not "just as good as another." Unless the most
threatening targets are engaged first, a force may be
destroyed before the advantage of higher process speeds can
come into play. The ideas buried in Boyd's model are thus
every bit as relevant to attrition as they are to maneuver.
Only in how these ideas are applied in combat -- how the
commander intends to shape war's environment -- do these two
types of warfare significantly differ. The basic outline for
an all-purpose action model that can be used to build a NSWA
is thus revealed.
D. FIELD-STRIPPING THE O-O-D-A LOOP
Before continuing, it will be helpful to examine the
O-O-D-A loop in a more systematic way. Boyd, in very broad,
bold strokes, outlined the steps for a universally relevant
combat model. But while "Patterns of Conflict" reports the
end result of research based on this model, it contains
precious little detail about the O-O-D-A loop itself. There
is a growing tendency in the military services to use
137
theoretical terminology rather casually. The tendency is
based on the dubious assumption of universal acceptance of the
definitions of such terms [Ref. 52:p. 46]. To prevent
confusion, what follows is the author's own interpretation and
expansion of Boyd's basic command and action model. These
interpretations will carry over into the framework of the
NSWA.
Note that unlike the S-E-D-A cycle, the components of the
O-O-D-A loop are described with nouns instead of verbs. As
previously discussed, this is because Boyd views each step
within the loop as a distinct process; they do not (although
they can) denote one-step actions [Ref. 74]. It is
interesting to ponder Boyd's exact choice of nouns to describe
the loop's four subprocesses. Since he never explicitly
defines these terms in his study, one is forced to go to the
dictionary to unlock the subtleties of his creation.
Observation is the loop's trigger. It is the act,
practice, or power of noting and recording acts and events.
It also describes the data so noted and recorded [Ref. 19:p.
1235]. There are three important points here. First, events
or facts noted but not recorded do not add to the process.
Second, the "power" of observation implies that observation
is not simply an act, but a talent that will vary from leader
to leader, force to force. Third, the output of the process
is data, not information. The distinction is critical: data
is merely a listing of the facts and events noted and
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recorded; information is that which alters or reinforces a
commander's understanding about his environment. Since
commanders base decisions on information, not data [Ref. 75],
observation implies, even requires, an intermediate subprocess
before a commander's decision can be made.
In a Clausewitzian sense, observation is an attempt to
pierce the fog of war and to increase a commander's level of
certainty -- certainty about the level of immediate danger;
certainty about the state and activities of enemy force;
certainty about the countless factors that together constitute
the combat environment; and certainty about the state and
activities of friendly forces [Ref. 45:p. 264]. Observation
is thus seen to have four key components. First, observations
may be made to alert or warn the commander of imminent danger.
Observations of this type, designed specifically to prevent
surprise through early warning of enemy threats, will
hereafter be referred to by the phrase "watch and listen."
If watch and listen is the shield provided by observation,
then "search and scout" is the sword. This is the determined
attempt to seek out an enemy's critical vulnerabilities. In
the process, searching and scouting also find enemy strengths.
In other words, this type of observation is aimed at
increasing the commander's level of certainty about the
overall state of enemy forces. Combat factors determination
is self-explanatory. It describes all observations made to
characterize the general and specific battle environment,
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i.e., weather, terrain analysis, etc. Finally, there is
"force monitoring," critical self-observations made by both
the commander and his forces on their state of readiness.
Personal observations by a commander may trigger the start
of a O-O-D-A loop. Normally, however, the scope of
battlestorms prevents the commander from being able to
personally observe the entire battlefield. As a result,
observation is most often carried out for the commander by his
forces and the technical means at their disposal.
Observations made by higher or supporting forces may also be
used by a commander to help reduce his level of uncertainty,
but for now the focus is only on those forces and assets that
combat leader can directly control to help him peer through
the fog of war.
Even with the help of his forces and their technology, a
commander will sense only some of the activity within the
combat environment. Friction and chance play an especially
heavy role in the observation subprocess. Enemy preparations
are missed, battlefield obstacles not spotted, events are
misinterpreted, and friendly units do not report their
readiness. Or perhaps the preparations and obstacles are
spotted, but this data does not reach the commander. In any
event, the transition from observation to the next stage of
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the combat action cycle is marked by the transmission of some
data to the commander.5
An important point here is that the amount of data
received by the commander always seems inadequate in combat.
In fact, the level of friction in the observation subprocess
might be conceptually measured by the percentage of data that
fails to reach the commander, plus the percentage of received
data that is based on false perceptions by observers. As the
level of friction climbs, so too does the probability that
critical events or facts will never reach the combat leader.
Friction in the observation subprocess, multiplied by the
effects of chance, is one of the primary causes of surprise
in combat.
The next stage of the Boyd cycle is orientation.
Orientation is the familiarization with the adaptation to a
situation or environment; the interpretation of the
environment as to time, space, objects, and persons. The key
word here is interpretation, which means to have one's own
understanding of the meaning of [Ref. 19:pp. 960 & 1261]. In
other words, orientation is the process of collecting all data
from observation, converting it into information, and then
interpreting the information in such a way as to form a mental
picture of the environment. Since the commander's own
'The transition between stages within the O-O-D-A loop, or
between separate loop iterations, is called a "transient maneuver"
by Boyd. Fast transient maneuvers are an important contributor to
high process speeds, i.e., high tempo [Ref. 73:p. 6].
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interpretation of information is always based on incomplete
or false data, it may or may not be correct. It is merely an
impression -- a vague notion or feeling; an inkling of the %ay
things are [Ref. 19:p. 916].
Although the commander often has a staff to help him
collect and collate data strea.Lng in from the observation
stage, and even to help him convert that data into
information, orientationl in essence describes his personal
interpretation of available information. It is therefore the
part of Boyd's loop that helps explain the role of uncertainty
in war;
Since all information and assumptions are open to
doubt, and with chance at work everywhere, the
commander continually finds that things are not as he
expected. This is bound to influence his plans, or
at least the assumptions underlying them. If this
influence is sufficiently powerful to cause a change
in his plans, he must usually work out new ones; but
for these the necessary information may not be
immediately available...Usually, of course, new
information and reevaluation are not enough to make
us give up our intentions; they only call them in
question. We now know more, but this makes us more,
not less uncertain. [Ref. 42:p. 102]
Orientation is thus a critical intermediate stage in the
combat action process. This stage reflects the inner
psychological struggle that takes place in the mind of the
commander. The commander is faced on one hand with
contradictory and uncertain information and on the other with
a need to do sorething about his enemy. At the very least, he
rust objectively evaluate the information, being careful not
to interpret what is available as he would like or hore it to
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be [Ref. 49:p. 27]. The most he can hope foi is taat he is
blessed with that Clatsewitz referred to as coup d'oeil -- the
inward eye -- the "quick recognition of the truth that the
mind would ordinarily miss or would perceive only after long
study and reflection [Ref. 42:p. 102]. In either case, until
tne commander forms an impression about the environment, the
cycle is stalled, and he cannot mold or shape the combat
climate. Throughout this period of indecision, the commander
and his forces are at the mercy of chance, disorder, and the
enemy. As such, this stage is the focal point of both
surprise and deception in war.
At some point the commander is either sati3fied with or
is forced by time or events to accept the information at hand.
The commander's unique synthesis of the available infonation
determines his impression of the environment with respect to
time, space, and enemy and friendly forces. A commander's
"final" interpretation of the environment -- his estimate of
the situation -- marks both the end of orientation and the
transient maneuver to the next stage of the combat action
process.
Decision describes the act of deciding or settling a
dispute or question by giving a judgment; the act of making
up one's mind [Ref. 19:p. 471]. It is the central hub of the
O-O-D-A cycle: observation and orientation are two preparatory
steps toward decision, while action represents its physical
manifestation. A conander's decision is based squarely on
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his personal estimate of the situation, which indicates what
has to be done with respect to the enemy. This estimate
springs from impressions of danger, uncertainty, or enemy and
friendly vulnerabilities. In the first case the commander
seeks to prepare/deploy his forces to meet the perceived
threat; in the second to seek new information; in the third
to concentrate and threaten or attack; in the last to disperse
or defend. In all cases, the commander may seek to deceive
his enemy about his intentions. Regardless of the decision,
however, its intent is the same: to shape the climate of
combat or direct the fury of battle to gain a combat
advantage.
The decision subprocess implicitly includes all tasks that
help the commander to make up his mind and to convert his
decision into a coherent plan of action. Thus command and
staff actions are an integral part of the decision stage.
These include, but are not limited to, selecting objectives,
preparing alternative courses of action, developing detailed
plans. Never forget, however, that like orientation, the
decision stage is focused on and is the sole responsibility
of the commander. It is the commander alone who must select
a course of action with an acceptable degree of risk; and it
is his creative ability which devises a plan that takes
friction into account and has a reasonable chance of success
[Ref. 51:pp. 19-20]. An additional requirement is that his
selected course of action and its associated plan conform to
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direction and guidance from other senior commanders (i.e.,
ROE's), so as to ensure coordinated action within the combat
force.
While a cogent and accurate decision, backed up by the
most detailed plan possible within time constraints, is the
goal of the decision process, it does not mark its end.
Unless the commander's intent and plan are relayed to his
forces, the combat action cycle once again stalls. Moreover,
unless the commander reports his decisions and supporting
requests to higher levels of command, he runs the risk of
disrupting both his own and his senior's plans. Transmitting
orders, plans, and requests are the final outcome of the
decision subprocess, and mark the transient maneuver to the
last and final stage of the O-O-D-A loop. This transition is
one of the key targets of the enemy; if it can be severed or
delayed, he gains a significant advantage in battle. Since
transmission of orders now occurs almost exclusively by
electronic means, the move to disrupt this link has its own
title: radio-electronic combat, or REC.
The comrander's orders set his forces into action -- the
state of acting or moving; the exertion of power or force
[Ref. 19:p. 20]. Action is the agent of change in the combat
environment, and is measured by potential or actual combat
power generated by the commander's forces. The focus of
action, like the commander's decision which prompts it, is
thus always on the enemy.
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Actions can be characterized in two complementary ways.
The first is by description: i.e., rehearsal, reposition,
demonstration, attack, or deception. This approach is
measured by potential combat power; it reflects the
commander's intent -- how he desires to mold or shape the
climate of combat in his favor. The second way is by
decomposing the description into specific combat acts: i.e.,
shoot, move, or communicate. This approach is concerned more
with how these acts contribute to the generation of actual
combat power.
However they are categorized, actions cause one of three
changes to the combat environment. A change may first be
expected, and compel the enemy to do generally what the
commander wants them to do. Second, a change may be totally
unexpected, leaving the enemy in either the same or even
superior position. As the commander's forces constantly
battle friction as well as the enemy, this type of outcome is
common in combat. Finally, the changes may be expected, but
cause negligible effect on either the enemy or the
environment. In this case, the actions either lack relevance
-- they are not directed against a critical vulnerability --
or they have been "overtaken by events." In other words, the
impression upon which the commander's estimate of the
situation and the decision was based is wrong or is outdated
and superfluous. This is often the outcome when the enemy is
operating with higher relative process speeds. Whatever the
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intended effect, however, change to the environment marks the
trigger for, and the transition to, a new O-O-D-A cycle.
E. SUMMARY
The elegant simplicity and deceptive complexity of John
Boyd's O-O-D-A loop make it an ideal action model for use
within the framework of a NSWA. Figure 8 is a final look at
the O-O-D-A loop based on the key points covered above, with
one additional twist: the figure shows the interaction between
two O-O-D-A cycles. The cycles depict leaders operating at
two different levels of war, or a combat leader and his
immediate superior within the same level. Of course, imbedded
within the action stage of both commanders are similar cycles
for all of their subordinate leaders, but for simplicity's
sake, these are not shown. Two quick observations follow.
Advances in data transmission technology blur the
distinction between the two observation subprocesses. Armed
with the necessary devices, commanders can now receive data
directly from observers over whom they have no direct control.
Because of the high level of uncertainty in war, this sharing
of observation platforms and their data is natural; the larger
the number of observers, the greater the chance that truly
significant events will be recorded. The incestuous
relationship is much different than the exchange of
information that routinely occurs between the two orientation
147
0~E





( ~ ~ U W-
0 ClC0 u w~ 0
cc a
(n-










Figure 8. ThinOnALop ve
148
subprocesses. There the exchange deals with processed,
instead of raw data. As a result, the receiver of the
information is less certain about its accuracy or the means
by which it was derived.
As mentioned before, one goal in war is to achieve
coordinated combat action. This demands a close relationship
between commanders in and within different levels of command.
As indicated in Figure 8, this relationship is maintained by
sharing information, by direction and guidance down the chain
of command, and by requests and reports up the chain of
command. But notice that these exchanges between different
commanders occur only at the beginning of the second stage and
the end of the third. This is because it is difficult to
break up the orientation-decision chain, as it is so dependent
on the individual commander and is own impression of the
environment. The critical importance of the commander's
warti*n,, tule should now be obvious.
Having looked at the nature of war, developed important
warfighting concepts, and built an effective combat action
model, the groundwork is now complete. In the next chapter,
the National Space Warfighting Space Architecture will be
erected.
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VII. A NATIONAL SPACE WARFIGHTING ARCHITECTURE
A. INTRODUCTION
In the previous four chapters, the author has attempted
to forge a common conceptualization of: the NSWA's appropriate
baseline combat missions; its unique operating environment;
individual and organizational combat decision-action
processes; and important concepts that will help to logically
organize the architecture. In the process, the author has
also sought to develop a common vocabulary among managers of
the SSRSP, space support officers, and warfighters of all
services. The stage is now set to combine and unify all of
the preceding terms, ideas, and concepts into a cohesive
framework for dialogue about space-based combat support. This
framework takes the form of a National Space Warfighting
Architecture.
To reemphasize, the architectural design that follows is
not intend to be complete; it is a top level architecture
only. As the reader will recall, the central premise of this
thesis is that a space warfighting architecture is the most
effective alternative to fill the void that exists between the
National Space Policies and emerging service space warfighting
plans. The purpose of this chapter is to present one possible
template for a NSWA, and to defend the logic behind its
construction. In so doing, the author hopes to make clear
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the architecture's usefulness as framework for debate about
space-based combat support.
B. A PROPOSED NATIONAL SPACE WARFIGHTING ARCHITECTURE
1. General
Figure 9 is a top-down decomposition of a proposed
NSWA. From top to bottom, the architecture consists of the
following five sublevels: (space combat) mission; (supported)
level of command; (command and action) process; (process)
function; and (feasible technology) task(s).
Although many of the terms and phrases used within the
architecture will be recognized from the groundwork laid in
the previous chapters, the reader is cautioned not to become
overly focused on the particular phraseology developed by the
author. Instead, the reader should concentrate on the
reasoning behind, and the advantages of, the particular
architectural framework depicted. If and when a top level
NSWA is pursued, the national security space sector would have
to agree upon and fully define all of its component parts.
The terms contained herein are simply recommendations based
upon the author's research and perspectives.
Note that the architecture's decomposition strategy is
shown for only one of the NSWA's three combat missions. This
thesis is most concerned with space-based support of
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emphasis. Suffice it to say, the decomposition strategy for
the other two missions would be identical down through the
function sublevel. In other words, the only difference in the
decomposition strategy for "Counter-space Operations" and
"Space-based Fire Support" would be found at the feasible
technology task sublevel. As the primary aim of this thesis
is to demonstrate one possible template for the NSWA and to
defend the logic behind its construction, concentrating on
only one r Lssion will in no way prevent the objectives of this
thesis from being met.
2. The (Space Combat) Mission Sublevel
An architecture springs from, and its structure is
guided by, a set of explicit design missions. It should
therefore come as no surprise that the first sublevel
identifies the NSWA's appropriate conbat missions. However,
the reader will notice that the mission titles do not exactly
match the baseline combat missions identified in Chapter III.
Why the switch in titles? What exactly do these combat
missions entail? How do they differ from the missions
designated by national policy? The purpose of this section
is to answer these questions.
First, the switch in titles. Changing the skeptical
attitude that many warfighters feel about space-based combat
support will require a coordinated, multi-level effort. This
effort would include, among other things, better education
(based on relaxed security requirements), training, and space
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support exercises. However, the glue to hold all of these
highly visible programs together is a common vocabulary and
conceptual view of space support among the warfighter, space
support officers, and managers of the SSRSP. And in this
author's opinion, the emphasis of the extant space support
vocabulary is too remote from its warfighting roots. How many
infantry battalion commanders talk about "force application?"
How important is "space control" to the operations of a
fighter squadron? Just what does "force enhancement" mean?
Does force refer to an aggregation of combat units, or to
combat force, the prerequisite for generating combat power?
To be successful in its intent, the National Space Warfighting
Architecture must use terms that the warfighters both
understand and appreciate. The titles of the NSWA's combat
missions are chosen with this thought in mind.
Space-based Combat Support of Warfighting Forces and
Operations involves using on-orbit space systems to create an
advantage in terrestrial combat. It is analogous to the force
enhancement space mission. Its final aim is to improve both
the combat effectiveness and combat performance of terrestrial
fighting forces. The former is accomplished by using space
systems to help reduce the commander's level of uncertainty
and help him to identify enemy critical vulnerabilities; the
latter by using space systems to help reduce the frictions
encountered by the commander's forces in combat. Space-based
combat support is realized through the delivery of data from
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on-orbit spacecraft to either the commander or the warfighter.
Indirect space-based combat support involves the exchange or
receipt of preprocessed information that includes at least
some input from space systems. When reviewing this
preprocessed information, the parts derived from space
platforms may or may not be obvious to the warfighter. [Ref.
12:p. 1-2].
Counter-space Operations are related to, but
conceptually broader than, the space control mission. Its
title is specifically chosen to soften the politically
threatening tone of "space control;" and to emphasize that its
primary intent is to support terrestrial operations and not
to "dominate" the heavens. It involves all activities taken
by warfighting commanders and their forces to degrade the
performance of enemy space support capabilities. In other
words, counter-space operations aim to increase force
effectiveness by providing a relative superiority in space
combat support. This mission includes, but is not limited to:
space reconnaissance to identify the function of enemy space
systems; space survellarice to provide early warning of
attacks on friendly space assets; defensive space maneuvers;
terrestrial evasion and other deception operations; attacks
on enemy space command and control, launch, and dissemination
networks; and ground-based antisatellite operations. It would
also include those actions taken to ensure that the enemy did
not benefit from US space capabilities. The intentional
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corruption of the GPS commercial signal is an example of such
actions.
Space-based Fire Support is related to the force
application mission. Its aim is self explanatory -- the
delivery of fires in direct or general support of either
terrestrial forces or friendly space assets. The key is that
the fire support is delivered from an orbiting weapon system.
Although national policy now focuses mainly on space-based
defensive fires in support of the strategic and strategic
warfighting levels of war, this mission conceptually embraces
offensive and defensive fire support satellites in support of
any level of war. Again, however, this is a pure combat
mission; it guides but does not include associated research
and development activities such as the Strategic Defense
Initiative.
3. The (Supported) Level of Command Sublevel
The Level of Command sublevel, patterned after the
levels of war/command introduced in Chapter V, is the linchpin
of the NSWA's "how-to-organize" approach. This sublevel
serves two primary purposes. First, it makes clear that
during times of war, tle entire YLational security space
program exists for one reason: to help the warfighter -- be
it the strategic CINC or a division commander -- to gain a
relative advantage in war and combat. Second, it implies that
the relative advantage sought from space-based support may be
different depending on the support level of command. As was
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discussed in Chapter V, warfighting commanders at different
levels of war view and attack their enemy's critical
vulnerabilities in subtly different ways. This level paves
the way to emphasize and identify these differences.
In addition to these two primary goals, this sublevel
serves several additional supporting aims. It puts the focus
of the architecture on the commander and his forces, and not
on the space technology that serves him. It organizes the
architecture's decision makers in a logical, hierarchical way,
thus facilitating the use of command overlays with the NSWA.
This will heip warfighters to better understand where and how
their own combat organizations fit within the architecture's
framework, as well as the reiationship among senior and
subordinate level commanders, all of whom compete for space
support. This sublevel will help to standardize and clarify
space support terminology. For example, a "tactical
satellite" will have a specific, ---y to understand meaning:
a satellite designed to proviec t sapport to division-
level and smaller units preparlau ci or engaged in battle.
It will aid all services to betttr focus their own space
warfightIng doctrine; i.e., Marine Corps space warfightinq
doctrine is concerned essentially with space-based
operational, tactical, and special operatic s support.
Finally, when decomposition is continued down through the
subarchitectx. a level, this organizational scheme will allow
the services to more accuiately match system measures of
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performance with the specific levels(s) of war that the system
is designed to support.
4. The (Command and Action) Process Sublevel
Having put the focus of the NSWA squarely on the
terrestrial fighting forces, the next sublevel describes their
combat command and action process. Recall that all forces,
at every level of war, go through conceptually identical
combat decision-action cycles. To be sure, the aim, scope,
and duration of the cycles at each level of war are different,
but their basic steps remain the same. These steps, defined
by the Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action loop introduced
and discussed in Chapter VI, form the process sublevel's four
components.
Building the NSWA around a universally relevant
command and action model serves three key purposes. The model
makes the NSWA equally suitable for use by an infantry
battalion commander, a carrier battle group commander, or a
unified commander. It provides a powerful conceptual
framework for discussion -- specific enough to shape debate
about space-based support among leaders with diverse views and
perspectives, yet flexible enough to accommodate their
different background and wartime missions.
Second, because the model emphasizes the inextricable
wartime relationship between the commander, his decisions, and
the resultant actions of his forces, it helps to highlight the
two conceptual roles that space-based combat support fulfills
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-- reducing the commander's level of uncertainty and limiting
the effects of friction on his forces. In this, the model
seems clearly superior to a command and control alternative,
which emphasizes the former role at the expense of the latter.
Finally, by including the command and action process
as an integral part of the architecture, each service has the
flexibility to pursue its own space warfighting doctrine
without undue constraints. Since the climate of combat is
ever-changing and unpredictable, a warfighting organization
must continuously adapt if it is to survive and impose its
will on its enemy. A successful fighting force therefore
foregoes preset rules and instead embraces and pursues an
environmental adaptation strategy -- a doctrine -- that both
anticipates and facilitates rapid adaptation to changing
events. Such a doctrine is designed to inculcate the need for
combat forces to influence the wartime environment rather than
be swept along by it, thereby providing the basis for
successful combat operations.
Note that there is no separate "doctrinal" sublevel
which explicitly lists the influencing approach that a command
level elects to follow. This is in keeping with the author's
belief that a national space warfighting doctrine is neither
practical nor desirable. As has been discussed, the Air Force
and the Navy are compelled by the special characteristics of
their "battlefields" to pursue a technology-driven attrition
doctrine. Meanwhile, both the Army and the Marine Corps are
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turning increasingly toward the idea-driven maneuvpr approach
[see Refs. 37,54,&62). Moreover, although a service may
embrace a specific adaptation approach as its general
warfighting doctrine, warfighting commanders and their forces
often combine both attrition and maneuver in their operations.
Building the NSWA around a universal combat action model that
describes both attrition and maneuver with equal effectiveness
does three things. It obviates the need for an overly
restrictive national space warfighting doctrine. It provides
each of the services the flexibility to develop their own
unique space warfighting doctrine while at the same time
fostering cohesiveness and common understanding regarding
space-based combat support. And it provides the conceptual
foundation for commanders and their forces to explore new
tactics and operations based on space-based support.
one final point. Note that the observation subprocess
is divided into direct support (DS) and general support (GS).
Direct support observations are made by space systems under
the direct control of the supported commander. That is to
say, the space system is a dedicated observation platform that
responds to the supported commander's tasking. This does not
'although it can) mean that the supported commander is
responsible for the on-orbit control of the observation
platform. On the other hand, general support observations are
those made in response to taskings by another level of
command, but whose resulting data is available for direct
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receipt by a combat commander. Therefore, general support
observations are distinct from the sharing of preprocessed
space information between the orientation subprocesses of
different levels of command.
The advantage of explicitly showing this breakdown is
to set the stage for being able to flexibly designate a
shifting main effort in space-based observation support.
Imagine, for example, that an especially important campaign
is about to begin. The initial main effort of the campaign
is a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) landing. To fully
integrate space-based support into his operations, the MEF
commander would be assigned space observation assets in direct
support -- he would have the authority to task on-orbit
systems to reduce his level of uncertainty. After the MEF has
established itself ashore, another unit might be designated
the campaign's main effort. From this time on, the MEF
commander would receive only general support from on-orbit
systems, and would have to rely on other organic assets or
forces in his observation effort.
5. The (Process) 7unction Sublevel
Regardless of the words or phrases used to describe
them, the next sublevel's components are the generic functions
that fully define each of the activities within the process
sublevel. The reader will recognize the phrases as those
introduced by the author in Chapter VI. However, as was
stated in the introduction to this section, the specific
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definitions are less important than the theme or concepts that
they represent.
Notice that the functions listed are associated only
with the observation and action activities, as well as the
transient maneuvers that link them to the two middle stages
of the O-O-D-A loop. Both orientation and decision are
primarily mental subprocesses that defy any easy description
or decomposition. Together these two stages define the art
of command. On the other hand, both the observation
subprocess, which is an integral step leading up to the
commander's decision, and the action subprocesses, which
transforms that decision into some tangible result, involve
systematic and repetitive actions carried out in large part
by a commander's forces. The constant and repetitive nature
of these actions make the observation and action subprocesses
relatively easy to describe and decompose.
One purpose of the function sublevel is strictly
organizational. It aims to establish a clearer conceptual link
between the appropriate activities of the command and action
process level and those functional tasks that can be
accomplished from space. For example, feasible technological
tasks associated with seeking out enemy critical
vulnerabilities are grouped under "scout and listen" instead
of just "observation." This extra decomposition stage helps
to better separate and identify system performance
requirements based on their conceptual intent.
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A second purpose of the function sublevel is to again
highlight the two primary ways in which space-based combat
support can be used to create a wartime advantage. Quite
clearly, the functions grouped under the observation
subproccess describe the four types of information that a
commander needs most to make a decision: the immediate
prospect of armed violence on the enemy's terms; the state and
dispositions of both friendly and enemy forces; and the
characteristics of the battlefield. Meanwhile, the functions
listed under the action subprocess are those often degraded
or modified by the frictions of war. When viewed as a whole,
the Lunction sublevel therefore provides a clear conceptual
difference between using space to reduce the commander's level
of uncertainty and using space to attempt to moderate the
effects of friction in his forces.
6. The (Feasible Technology) Task Sublevel
The tasks listed in the architecture's bottom sublevel
are meant to be neither exhaustive nor suggestive. They
merely represent some of the command and action processes'
component tasks that might conceivably be accomplished from
space. In keeping with the spirit of this thesis, the author
has no intention of defining or explaining each and every
technological task listed. Instead, the role of the sublevel
will be discussed in general, using examples as appropriate.
In a complete NSWA, tasks listed at this sublevel with
an associated subarchitecture would indicate to the warfighter
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that the space-based capability to accomplish the task is
either operational or in late stages of development. The
subarchitecture would provide detailed information about
tasking and dissemination information flows, sensor systems,
etc. Using this more detailed level of knowledge, the
capability offered by space support systems could be fully
integrated into combat plans and operations.
Tasks without an associated subarchitecture would
indicate either one of two things. First, it could be a
space-based capability identified as feasible by the Space
Research, Development, and Acquisition Architecture but not
yet being pursued by the warfighters. Perhaps the capability
is duplicated by other, more cost effective alternatives; or
perhaps the capability is not available due to political
constraints (i.e., an anti satellite capability).
Second, it could indicate a technology concept that
warfighters have identified to the SRDAA for further study or
development. An example of this type of task is Space-based
Wide Area Surveillance. The Navy and the Air Force agree such
a task is necessary and feasible, but they have not yet agreed
upon the specific technology to accomplish it. The Air Force
favors an active radar system while the Navy prefers an
infrared system (Ref. 76:p. 3]. Once the technology is
selected and development is proceeding apace, one would expect
that a subarchitecture would be introduced to help warfighters
to plan and prepare how to best utilize the capability when
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it becomes available. The give and take that would occur at
this level between the NSWA and the SRDAA would better help
to drive on-orbit capabilities specifically tailored to
support terresetrial operations, and would hopefully prevent
another "GPS scenario" from occurring.
In some cases, different tasks may be accomplished by
a single space system that lends itself to several different
functional applications. For example, the multi-spectral
capability of LandSat lends itself to camouflage detection,
terrain analysis, and near-shore obstacle identification.
Moreover, while its 30-meter resolution makes it unsuitable
for precise identification of targets, it is still useful as
a surveillance tool to tip-off reconnaissance efforts when
change is detected in a given area [Ref. 30:p. 14]. By
listing all the tasks that a given payload can accomplish and
associating it with the appropriate command action process
function, warfighting commanders can better see the broad
range of capabilities and cost effectiveness of space systems.
Moreover, when such an approach is diligently followed, it
will help consolidate spacecraft design and deployment
efforts, avoiding costly duplication of effort.
Identifying specific functional tasks that can be
accomplished from space also helps decision makers to make
valid one-to-one comparison among space systems and similar
terrestrial combat support systems. For example, space-based
electronic reconnaissance satellites designed to identify
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enemy orders of battle for specific levels of command can be
readily compared to analogous terrestrial systems. Such a
framework both sets the stage for meaningful tradeoff analyses
among competing technological approaches, as well as
highlights deficiencies in capabilities that might best be
addressed through space systems.
C. THE NSWA AS A FRAMEWORK FOR DEBATE ABOUT SPACE-BASED
COMBAT SUPPORT
1. General
As can be seen, a NSWA provides a powerful means for
demonstrating to warfighters the real and potential utility
of space in support of terrestrial wartime operations. That
is, an NSWA, with associated subarchitectures, can be used as
a framework for demonstrating the uses and roles of on-orbit
systems, and how they might best be integrated into the combat
action process. And it also provides a conceptual framework
for developinq new tactics based on unique space capabilities.
However, an NSWA also provides the means to accomplish a third
important function: debating the proper emphasis and direction
of space-based combat support. To demonstrate, the author
will quickly review four subjects raised in this thesis from
the perspective of the NSWA proposed in the previous section.
2. Reducing Uncertainty versus Reducing Fiction
The NSWA is designed to bring into focus an important
choice in the direction and conceptual intent of space-based
combat support. When officers from the Naval Space Command
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give briefs about their unit's mission, they show a slide that
states: "Space = Information" [Ref. 77]. As far as it goes,
this statement is certainly correct. But as the NSWA
demonstrates, there are two different ways to use this
information to gain a wartime advantage. One is to use it to
reduce the commander's level of uncertainty and to help him
pinpoint his enemy's critical vulnerability. The other is to
use it to moderate the level of friction encountered by the
commander's forces in combat. The former seeks to increase
combat effectiveness while the latter aims to increase combat
performance. The distinction between these two conceptual
approaches may be subtle, but an emphasis of one over the
other in the NSWA will have far-reaching implications on the
direction of space-based combat support.
The present emphasis of national space-based combat
support is clearly on reducing the commander's level of
uncertainty. This emphasis is not surprising. As has been
seen, the original motivation behind pursing a national
security space '-.pability was to reduce the strategic CINC's
uncertainty about the Soviet Union's intentions and military
capabilities. And in this endeavor the SSRSP has been
singularly successful. As President Johnson stated (off the
record) in 1967:
...we've spent 35 or 40 billion dollars on the space
program. And if nothing else had come out of it
except the knowledge we've gained from space
photography, it would be worth ten times what the
whole program has cost. Because tonight we know how
many missiles the enemy has and, as it turned out, our
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guesses were way off. We were doing things we didn't
need to do.. .We were harboring fears we didn't need
to harbor [Ref. 7:p. vii].
The very success of the SSRSP has, to a large degree,
colored the subsequent conceptual development of national
space-based warfighiting support. For example, theater CINC's
now believe that "given space systems' mounting value as force
multipliers...(they) must be sure they will be given strong
wartime backing" from space systems [Ref. 78:p. 36]. To be
sure that they receive this backing, they seek the development
of reconnaissance TacSats, which will be used to determine if
"the enemy wing has dispersed, or if the bridge is still
intact;" i.e., to reduce their level of uncertainty.
The emphasis upon using space information to reduce a
commander's level of uncertainty leads naturally to heavy
restrictions on its availability for other uses. Consider the
following passage:
The improvements in sensing, EW, and C3 bring the
"information war" to the forefront. The attempt to
gain an information advantage by observing the other
sides forces and activities while denying them such
information about one's own forces becomes a primary
rather than ancillary part of direct conflict.
[Ref. 79: p. 77]
In an information war, the primary goal is to gain a
relative advantage over the opposing commander by reducing
friendly uncertainty while increasing the enemy's. With such
a goal, protection of lucrative information sources becomes
a paramount concern. The result is often compartmentation of
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both the information itself, as well as the means by which it
is collected.
This seems to be the primary motivation behind keeping
basic capabilities of SSRSP satellites and operations so
highly classified. The "take" from these satellites and
operation is tightly controlled by the CIA and military
intelligence services, and is reserved for use primarily by
the highest levels of command. Information that is made
available to operation and tactical commanders is carefully
edited to protect its source, and is controlled within
intelligence channels with strict dissemination and
distribution guidelines [Ref. 78:p. 36]. As a result, the
information is often not available for the second conceptual
role of space-based combat support -- reducing combat
friction.
At the lower levels of war, where disorder and chaos
are at their maximum, critical vulnerabilities are not always
evident and uncertainty is a fact of life. Commanders are
often forced to pursue lesser vulnerabilities until a path to
the critical weakness is discovered. It would therefore seem
that at the lower levels of war, especially the tactical and
special operations levels, space information is best suited
for reducing the inevitable frictions that arise in pursuit
of the enemy's critical vulnerability. As was discussed in
Chapter IV, the effects of friction can never be eliminated.
However, efforts can be made to moderate its potential impact.
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One way to do this is through mission planning and realistic
rehearsals. And new advances in space technology make
possible revolutionary new ways to prepare, rehearse, and
execute tactical missions.
For example, when satellite digital imagery is
combined with LandSat and SPOT pictures, the resulting
composite "gives...a detailed portrait of any battlefield or
beach anywhere on the globe" [Ref. 78:p. 38]. This type of
seemingly mundane information offers considerable combat
advantages. As Napoleon said, one should always avoid a field
of battle reconnoitered and studied by the enemy [Ref. 80:p.
8]. The vantage point of space offers the opportunity to deny
potential adversaries the option of avoiding battlefields that
are not familiar to US forces.
Mission rehearsal simulators offer similar exciting
tactical possibilities. The Air Force is developing a mission
planning system, where in 30 minutes or less a pilot can "pre-
fly" an assigned combat mission through three-dimensional
scenes that exactly replicate the terrain and landmarks he
will see. The scenes are developed using electronically
enhanced SPOT imagery [Ref. 81:p. 21].
Although the aforementioned system is dedicated to
aviation, the potential tactical applications of similar
systems are mind-boggling. Imagine a fast-moving mechanized
force, maneuvering at night. Command vehicles, equipped with
moving 3-D route displays based on satellite imagery, compare
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the terrain depicted on the display with actual images of the
terrain made by low-light level television cameras. When
combined with GPS, which confirms the positions of column
vehicles and synchronizes the entire force in time, the
mechanized unit will be able to move quickly at night, hit
checkpoints with precise timing, anticipate ambush sites, and
exploit the terrain to best advantage in meeting engagements.
Clearly, the use of national space systems to help
moderate the effects of friction in combat offers substantial
tactical potential. However, . fully develop this potential,
many of the present restriGcions on space images and
information about their data transfer and dissemination would
have to be lifted. The NSWA provides a framework to explore
the tradeoffs between the increased combat performance
expected from making space information more widely available
outside intelligence channels and possible compromises
necessary in the information war raging at the higher levels
of command
3. T'.bAP versus TINCAP
At the beginning of this thesis, the euthor claimed
that before space combat support could be fully integrated
into terrestrial operations, the widespread "TENCAP attitude"
would have to be changed. One conceptual alternative to the
TE,4CAP approach toward space-bard combat support was
proposed: the Tactical Integratizn of National Capabilities.
Upon reflection, the debate about whether space information
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is best used to reduce the commander's level of uncertainty
or the forces' level of friction helps to highlight the
difference between the TENCAP and TINCAP approaches. The
TENCAP approach emphasizes using space information to reduce
uncertainty. Its heritage of protecting the source of space
information has both shaped and stultified the conceptual
development of national space-based combat support. The
TINCAP alternative acknowledges that space can best be used
to reduce the commander's level of uncertainty at the
strategic, strategic warfighting, and operational levels of
war. However, it expands the role of national systems to
include moderating the effects of friction at the tactical and
special operations levels of war. It truly seeks to bring the
parts of space-based combat support together as a whole, to
unify the conception of how space can best be used to win war
on earth.
As a result, the author would like to modify the
contention that a national space warfighting doctrine is
neither practical nor appropriate. The basic doctrine of
space-based combat support, the most fundamental and enduring
beliefs that guide the proper use of space-based combat
support in terrestrial military action, should be the Tactical
Integration of National Capabilities. This doctrine applies
equally well to all services, as well as the other important
components of the national security space sectors. Morecver,
it provides the solid foundation upon which the services can
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develop their own operational space doctrine. If embraced and
practiced, a TINCAP doctrine might very well hasten the day
when commanders view space-based support to be as important
in combat operations as airlift and artillery support.
4. TacSats
The NSWA also helps to clarify the debate about
TacSats. First, "TasSats" is an inaccurate title. No one is
recommending that direct support observation satellites be
developed for division level and smaller combat units.
Instead, TacSats are designed to be controlled by and provide
direct support to theater and operational commanders. As
such, the Air Force title for these satellites -- "Reserves"
-- is more appropriate, and will be used hereafter [Ref. 82:p.
2].
The call for reserve combat support satellites is
based on three interrelated factors. First, US military space
planners worry mainly about war with the Soviet Union, the
only potential military opponent with an operational ASAT
capability [Ref. 83:p. 34], As a result, they feel that:
Current US systems are a fragile, thin blue line --
a thin blue line that is not sufficiently backed up
by on-orbit spares or rapid replenishment capability.
In times of crisis or conflict, these systems would
not be sustainable. [Ref. 78:p. 38]
Second, as has been repeatedly emphasized, theater and
operational commanders distrust assurances that in a crisis
or major conflict SSRSP satellites will be available for
combat support. And third, even if services from these
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satellites are available, these commanders worry that the high
classification and distribution restrictions on provided
information will prevent its effective use in combat [Ref.
78:pp. 36-38].
Note that two of the reasons behind the calls for
reserve satellites are based solely on attitudes or self-
imposed restrictions, and the third is based on the most
highly unlikely of all military scenarios -- war with the
Soviet Union. An NSWA, supported by comprehensive DoD Space
Campaign and national level Inter-campaign Coordination Plans,
might provide the means to overcome these attitudes, and shift
the focus of this debate away from developing expensive,
duplicative space support capabilities and toward integrating
national systems into combat operations.
Integrating national capabilities would require, among
other things, the development of a better operational and
tactical observation support structure. In 1986, for example,
SSRSP imagery was available and used by officers planning the
raid on Libya. However, dissemination and data restriction
prevented the timely transmission of the photos to the units
conducting the raid. As a result, the photos were hand
carried from the US to the Mediterranean, a trip that took
three days [Ref. 78:p. 36]. More recently, the Air Force
Chief of Staff reported that when a senior commander in
Operation Desert Shield was asked about whether he was getting
enough space imagery, he replied, "I'm inundated with
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pictures; what I need is someone to analyze them for me" [Ref.
84:p. 8]. Both examples are instructive, for they point to
the real bottlenecks for effective integration. The former
implies that the data dissemination network is deficient, and
the latter that there are not enough imagery interpretation
experts to handle a large increase in space-dervied imagery.
Using the concept of flexibly designating main efforts in the
space observation program; allowing the commander of the main
effort to task national systems; improving the data/info
dissemination networks to include the development of general
support receivers; increasing the number of imagery
interpretation analysts; and then practicing these procedures
in peacetime space support exercises might demonstrate that
the need for reserve satellites is not so clear in a post cold
war world.
5. GPS Commercial Receivers
As was reported in the first chapter, both the Army
and the Marine Corps were forced to make emergency purchases
of commercial GPS receivers to outfit units deploying to Saudi
Arabia. After the crisis in the Persian Gulf is resolved,
further buys of commercial receivers should be carefully
considered. The DoD originally planned to procure only
military receivers -- those capable of converting the more
accurate encrypted GPS signal. However, "budget pressures"
are causing officials to consider supplementing purchases of
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the military receiver with additional purchases of the cheaper
commercial receivers [Ref. 85:p. 10].
While procuring additional receivers may make perfect
"dollar" sense, it flies in the face of the conceptual intent
of counter space operations -- increasing force effectiveness
by providing a relative advantage in space-based combat
support. Ten years from now, it is easy to envision that
potential adversaries will have ready access to commercial GPS
terminals. Recall that DoD has the flexibility to degrade the
GPS commercial signal during times of war to prevent enemy
forces from gaining operational benefit from the system.
Should large numbers of US fighting units be equipped with
commercial receivers and develop GPS-based combat tactics, it
will be difficult, if not impossible, to exercise that
flexibility.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Compare the example of a "generic" Naval Space
Warfighting Architecture (Naval SWA) introduced in Chapter I
(Figure 1) to the proposed National Space Warfighting
Architecture from Chapter VII (Figure 9). The major
differences between these two architectures help to summarize
the major points of this thesis. Specifically, a NSWA (along
with the associated space campaign plans and supporting
architectures) would: help fill the void that exists between
National and DoD space policies and emerging service
warfighting architectures; help unify space-based combat
support efforts of the national security space program; help
better educate warfighters about the formidable combat support
potential of national space capabilities; open the way for the
complete integration of national space-based combat support
into terrestrial plans and operations; and provide a framework
for debate about the proper emphasis. roles, and direction of
space-based combat support.
First, the focus of the Naval SWA is clearly on its
"space segment" -- the joint and service space commands,
satellites, and the satellite and payload control networks.
The warfighters are mere "users" of the services provided by
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Figure 9. National Space Warfig1hting Architecture
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the space segment. The focus of the National Space
Warfighting Architecture is exactly the opposite. It is
focused on the warfighting commanders and their respective
forces. National security space capabilities do not exist for
their own sake. They exist to provide fighting forces -- at
all levels of war -- with a means to shape the climate of
(terrestrial) combat in their favor. The NSWA is specifically
constructed to confirm and reinforce this fundamental fact.
Second, the Naval SWA deals primarily with physical
things: i.e., satellites, mission control and operation
centers, and command centers. This is in stark contrast to
the National Space Warfighting Architecture, which excludes
physical structures entirely. The heart of the National
Architecture is a conceptual command and action model. This
model, patterned after Boyd's O-O-D-A loop, allows the NSWA to
serve as a framework for discussion about the roles of space-
based combat support among all services. It is equally
relevant to every level of war and tactical situation.
The link between the NSWA's combat decision-action model
and space technology is established by the architecture's
technologically feasible task sublevel. This sublevel would
attempt to list every relevant command and action task that
can be, or could be, accomplished from space. In so doing,
the NSWA (and its appropriate subarchitectures) serves two
important purposes. It helps top portray how on-orbit space
capabilities can be integrated into wartime plans and
180
operations so as to create an advantage in battle. And it
helps to highlight the most promising candidates for future
space-based combat support systems. The Naval SWA does
include "technologically feasible satellites" (i.e.,
countermeasure satellites), but it fails to explain what
combat tasks that these satellites would perform.
By focusing on the warfighting contributions that space
systems offer from the perspective of the warfighter, the NSWA
provides a framework for debate about national space-based
combat support. Instead of a "user" of space systems, the
NSWA aims to make the warfighter the "driver" of on-orbit
combat capabilities. Space combat capabilities evolve around
two roles: reducing the commander's level of uncertainty, and
moderating the effects of friction on the actions of his
forces. Unlike the Naval SWA, the national architecture helps
to clarify these two roles. By so doing, the NSWA opens the
way for meaningful dialogue between the services and the
managers of the SSRSP about how the full potential of national
capabilities could be achieved in operations and tactics.
In conclusion, the author would like to submit three
short recommendations:
- For the national security space sector. Develop a
National Space Warfighting Architecture along the
lines proposed in this thesis. This would also
entail the development of associated space campaign
plans and supporting architectures. Consider the
adoption of a national space warfighting doctrine
of Tactical Integration of National Capabilities
(TINCAP).
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For the US Naval Space Command. Change the
emphasis of the Naval Space Warfighting
Architecture from space systems to those the
systems are designed to support: the warfighter.
Use the framework proposed herein to help generate
interest and debate about space-based combat
support within the naval service.
For the Marine Corps. Use the framework proposed
herein to: develop Marine Corps unique space-based
combat support doctrine; focus the Marine Corps
education program about space-based operational and
tactical combat support; and explore new tactics
based on unique space-support capabilities.
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